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AIMS AND SCOPE 
Defence Policy is a vital matter & should be taken 
seriously. Defence Policy covers external, internal and 
strategical points. The military base has much importance. It 
maintains law and order in the country and quells aggressions. 
The present work, in the form of annotated bibliography 
is the result of a continuous and constant attempt at searching 
all significant literature available on the topic. Although the 
bibliography is selective in nature but I have tried to be 
exhaustive by attempting to cover all important aspects of 
defence policy, i.e. the historical background, technological, 
political, social and economical aspects. 
It will be helpful to the Military personnel, 
researchers, students and even laymen. It have different 
attitudes with different countries. I have tried to highlight 
the main subject which is decision making. 
METHODOLOGY 
In order to complete this task, primary sources and 
other materials on defence policy, available in Maulana Azad 
Library, A..M.U., Aligarh, Centre for Strategic Studies 
Library, A.M.U., Aligarh and Institute for Defence Studies and 
Analyses, Delhi, were used. 
Out of number of periodicals covering the fields only 
important were selected for this purpose. 
IV 
standard Followed 
The Indian standards recommended for bibliographical 
references (IS : 2381-1963) and classified catalogue Code 
(ccc) of Dr. S .R.Ranganathan have been followed. In some 
cases where ISI do not give any guidance, I have taken 
appropriate decision. 
Subject Heading 
Attempt has been made to give co-extensive subject 
headings as much as possible. An humble effort has been 
made to follow 'postulates and principles' as suggested by 
Dr. S.R. Ranganathan in the formulation of subject 
headings. If more than one entry comes under the same 
subject heading, these are arranged strictly by the 
principle of Alphabetical sequence. 
Arrangement 
The entires are arranged under subject headings which 
are arranged alphabetically, following letter by letter 
method. The entry element of the author is in capitals, 
followed by the secondary element in parenthesis using 
capital and small letters and then the title of the 
V 
articles, subtitle (if any) then name of the periodical 
being underlined followed by the volume number, the year, 
month and date giving by using inclusive notation of the 
pages of the articles. The each entry is than followed by 
an informative abstracts of the article. 
Entries of periodical articles are arranged as 
follows : 
(a) Serial Number 
(bj Name of the Author/Authors 
(c) A full stop (.; 
(d) Title of the contribution including subtitle and 
alternative titles if any. 
(e) A Full stop ( .) 
(f) Title of periodical being underlined 
(g; A full stop (.) 
[ h ) Volume No. 
(, i ) Comma ( , j 
(J ) Issue number 
(k) Semi colon ( ,- ) 
(1) Year 
(m) Comma 
(n) Month 
VI 
(o) Date 
(p) Semi colon (;) 
(q) Inclusive pages of the articles 
(r) A full stop (.) 
Specimen entry 
185. MALIK (V P). Defence planning system in India, Strategic 
Analysis. 13,1; 1990, April; 29-44. 
There is an intimate connection between defence and 
development, between prosperity and security. Defence 
planning is as important as the development for the 
prosperity of the country. 
Abstract 
Each entry is followed by an abstract of the article. 
Abstract given are informative in sense not in length. 
Index 
The index part contains an author index and a title 
Index. Each index guides to the specific entry or entries 
in the bibliography by the help of entry number (sj. 
*********** 
P<di]rt (0)ne 
In troiductloini 
INTRODUCTION 
Meaning of Defence 
Any means resorted to of defending oneself against 
the attack of an enemy. 
Defence in Depth 
The sitting of mutually supporting defence positions 
designed to absorb and progressively weaken attack, prevent 
initial observations of the whole position by the enemy, 
and to allow the commander to manoeuver his reserves. 
India's Defence Policy 
The Government of india suggests that in the new 
world order, India is determined to play its geo-strategic 
role. This will now mean cooperation with both Moscow and 
Washington, amicable relations with China and improving 
ties with neighbouring countries. 
Though a founder non-aligned nation, India has been 
dependent on the Soviet Union for a considerable part of 
its armament acquisitions. The close military and 
technological ties between the two countries was used 
within India and abroad to question its non-aligned 
credentials. 
Close relations with the Soviet Union are expected 
to continue. This is most relevant in military matters, 
where India is heavily dependent on the Soviety Union as 
its defence industrial base is yet unable to stand on its 
disintegration 
own. However, the/of the Soviety Union in the aftermath 
of the failed coup, the political uncertainty in Russia 
the cataclysmic changes in Eastern Europe, the US victory 
in the recent Gulf war, strained US-Pak relations and 
improved indo-US ties are all expected to herald an era of 
cosy relations between India and the only remaining 
superpower. 
Washington has cut annual aid worth $ 400 million to 
Islamabad since October 1990 under the Pressler Amendment. 
The Americans are suddenly appreciatives of india's stand 
on Kashmir. Washington has ruled out a plebiscite on 
Kashmir and suggested that the issue be resolved 
bilaterally between India and Pakistan under the Simla 
agreement. 
Present Status of Armed Forces 
ORGANISATION 
The three services function under their respective 
Chiefs of Staff. As on December 1996 the Chiefs of Staff 
are : 
Chief of the Army Staff 
Chief of the Naval Staff 
General S Roy Chawdhury 
Admiral Vishnu Bhagat 
Chief of the Air Staff Air Chief Marshal Satish 
Kumar Sareen 
ARMY 
At the army hedquarters in New Delhi, the Chief of 
the Army Staff is assisted by the Vice-Chief of the Army 
Staff and seven other Principal Staff Officers, namely, the 
two Deputy Chiefs of the Army Staff, Adjutant General, 
Quarter-Master General, Master General of ordnance, 
Military Secretary and Engineer-in-Chief. 
The Army is organised into five operational 
Commands, viz.. Southern, Eastern, Western, Central and 
Northern Command and one Training Command. Each Command is 
under a General Officer Commanding-in-Chief who holds the 
rank of Lieutenant General. General Officer 
Commanding-in-Chief commanding anoperative command is the 
commander of demarcated geographical area and has both 
field and static formations under the command. The major 
field formations are Corps, Division and Brigade commanded 
by a General Officer Commanding of the rank of Major 
/ 
General and Brigadier, respectively. The major static 
formations are Area, Independent Sub Areas and Sub Areas. 
An Area is commanded by a General Officer Commanding of the 
rank of Major General and an Independent Sub-Area and 
Sub-Area by a Brigadier. 
The Army consists of a number of arms and services. 
These are Armoured Corps, Regiment of Artillery, Corps of 
Air Defence, Artillery, Army Aviation Corps, Corps of 
Engineers, Corps of Signals, Mechanised Infantry, Infantry. 
Army Service Corps, Military Nursing Service, Army Medical 
Corps, Army Dental Corps, Army Ordnance Corps, Corps of 
Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, Remount and Veterinary 
Corps, Military Farms Service, Army Education Corps, 
Intelligence Corps, Corps of Military Police, judge 
Advocate General Department, Army Physical Training Corps, 
Pioneer Corps, Army Postal Service, Territorial Army, 
Defence Security Corps. In addition, the Army has its own 
Recruiting Organisation, Record offices. Depots, Boys 
Establishments and Selection Centres and Training 
institutions. 
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NAVY 
The Navy is responsible for defence and security of 
India's maritime interests and assets, both in times of war 
and peace. The Chief of the Navel Staff at the Naval 
Headquarters, New Delhi, is assisted by four Principal 
Staff Officers, namely, the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff, 
Chief of Personnel, Chief of Material and Deputy Chief of 
Naval Staff. The Navy has three commands, i.e.. Western 
Eastern and Southern with their headquarters located at 
Bombay, Visakhapatnam and Cochin respectively. Each command 
is headed by a Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief in the rank 
of Vice Admiral. Western Command and Eastern Command have 
under them operational fleets i.e. Western and Eastern 
Fleets comprising warships, submarines, aircraft and other 
support ships. Southern Naval Command is responsible for 
all training activities of the India Navy. 
The Indian Navy is a well balanced three dimensional 
force consisting of sophisticated missile capable warships, 
two aircraft carriers, minesweepers, advanced submarines 
and the latest aircraft in its inventory. Many of the 
warships are of indigenous design and have been constructed 
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in Indian shipyards. These ships compare well with the 
ships of similar capability constructed by the advanced 
countries. The Naval forces are maintained and supported by 
modern dockyard facilities encompassing state of the art 
technology. At present it has two major Naval bases at 
Bombay and Visakhapatnam. 
COAST GUARD 
The Coast Guard was constituted as an armed force of 
the union in 1978 under the Coast Guard Act to protect the 
maritime and other national interestsin the maritime zones 
of india, covering an area of approximately 28 lakh sq km. 
The force, which is headed by Director General Coast Guard, 
is functioning udner the effective control of the Ministry 
of Defence. The headquarters of the force is presently 
located in New Delhi and regional headquarters are at 
Bombay, Madras and Port Blair. The three regions namely. 
Western, Eastern and Andaman and Nicobar cover 10 
districts, one in each of the eight coastal states in the 
mainland and two in Andaman and Nicobar Islands. At 
present, the Coast Guard district headquarters are 
functioning at Vadinar, Okha and Porbandar in Gujarat, 
Cochin in Kerala, Mandapam and Tuticorin in Tamil Nadu, 
Visakhapatnam, Paradeep in Orissa, Digilipur and Campbell 
Bay in Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Coast Guard air 
enclaves are functioning at Goa and Calcutta. 
Coast Guard air station squadrons are in operation at Daman 
and Madras. Establishment of DHQ at Goa and stations at 
Kavaratti and Kamorta are being planned. 
The force has effectively served national 
interestsin high-risk areas. Special trawlers fishing 
illegally have been apprehended. Coast Guard ships and 
aircraft have been regularly assisting the customs 
authorities in anti s^ iuggling operations. Besides, the force 
is available for search and rescue operations, 
anti-pollution and other duties in the maritime zones of 
the country. The recent oil spill situations of Nicobar 
islands and Bombay were efficiently handled by the Coast 
Guard. 
AIR FORCE 
The Air Force is organised both on functional as 
well as geographical basis. There are five 
operationalcommands. These are : Western Air Command, 
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South-Western Air Commnd, Central Air Command, Eastern Air 
Command and Southern Air Command. In addition, Maintenance 
Command and Training command are two functional commands. 
At the Air Headquarters in New Delhi the Chief of the Air 
Staff is assisted by the Vice-Chief of Air Staff, Deputy 
Chief of Air Staff, Air Officer In charge Maintenance, Air 
Officer Incharge Personnel and Inspector General Flight 
Safety and Inspection. These six Principal Staff Officers 
are assisted by Assistant Chiefs of Air Staff. 
Today, the Air Force consists of an array of modern 
aircraft. Its fleet consists of fighter bombers, air 
superiority fighters, interceptors, transport and logistic 
aircraft and helicopters. The fighter force comprises 
Hunters i^ which is an older generation aircraft), MIG-21 
variants, MiG-23s, MiG-25s, MiG-27s and Jaguar which 
represent the modern generation strike airctaft. Mig-29s 
and Mirage-2000 Provide the Air Force with a present 
generation air defence aircraft. The ageing fight bombers, 
Canberra is presently used in ancillary roles. The trnsport 
fleet consists of IL-76s, AN-32s, Boeing-737 and 
indigenously produced HS-748. Dontier-228 has replaced the 
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Ottar aircraft and is manufactured under licence by the 
HAL. The helicopter fleet consists of MI-8s, MT-17s, 
Chetak, Cheetah and MI-26. In addition the force has been 
supplemented with MI-25s and MI-35s which are used as 
attack helicopters. MI-25 helicopter has done yeoman 
service for the IPKE in Sri Lanka. Chetak/Cheetah 
helicopters are manufactured by HAL for the Air Force. They 
are used as airborne Forward Air Controller (FAC), 
Anti-Tank G'iiae<3 Missile (ATGM) carrier and for search and 
rescue operations. HPT-32 manufactured by HAL is used as 
the basic trainer aircraft. HJT - 16 (Kiran) and Pulish 
Iskara aircrafts are used as trainers in the applied stage 
of training. HS-748 is used as transport aircraft trainer. 
The Air Force MI-8 Helicopters are specially modified to 
undertake tasks in Antarctica. MI-17 and Chetak are used 
for high-altitude operations. They provide logistics 
support to ground forces. 
PRODUCTION AND SUPPLIES 
A substantial part of defence stores needed by the 
Services is now being developed and produced within the 
country. The responsibility for this has been entrusted to 
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the Department of Defence production and Supplies in the 
Ministry of Defence. The Department directs and coordinates 
production of material and equipment required by the armed 
forces. 
ORDNANCE FACTORIES 
At present, 39 ordnance factories spread all over 
India operate a wide-range of technologies and product 
mix. Some of the important products are field guns, 
anti-aircraft guns, mortars, various small arms and 
ammunition for weapons and guns, rockets, projects, 
pyro-technics, bombs, grenades, mines, demolition charges, 
depth charges, infantry combat vehicles, battle tanks, 
self-propelled guns, transport trucks and patrol vehicles, 
high-altitude and combat clothing, optical and fire control 
instruments, engineering equipment, supply dropping 
equipment including parachutes, rubberised items, various 
knitted and woven items like blankets, web equipment and a 
wide range of general stores are produced by them. 
Production of 5.56 mm (indigenously designed) weapon 
systemhas started in Ordnance factories. These factories 
are also producing bombs required by Air Force. Besides , 
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liquid fuel required for successful flight trials of 
Prithvi and Agni missiles, igniters and copper liners for 
the warheads were also supplied in the development of 
Prithvi missile. To utilise the spareable capacities, after 
meeting the services' requirements linear and lateral shift 
in customer product profiles has been taken up as a major 
thrust area of operatons. The production of Ajeya tank 
(T-72), Sarath (BMP-II), infantry combat vehicles are 
carried out at Heavy Vehicle Factory, Avadi and Ordnance 
Factory, Medak, respectively. A sophisticated 
opto-electronic production unit has been set up at Dehradun 
to produce the opto-electronic fire control and night 
vision devices required for Ajeya Tank (T-72-MI) and Sarath 
Vehicle (BMP-II). Completely indigenous production of Ajeya 
Tank and Sarath infantry combat vehicle is planned from 
1994-95. 
DEFENCE UNDERTAKINGS 
There are eight public sector undertakings (PSUs 
under the Department of Defence Production and Supplies, 
out of which five are wholly owned by the Government of 
India. These are Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), 
Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), Mazagon Dock Limited 
(MDL;, Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineering limited 
(GRSE), Goa Shipyards Limited (GSL), Bharat Dynamics 
Limited ^BDL) and Mishra Dhatu NigamLimited (MIDHANI). 
These undertaking, besides meeting the requirements of the 
defence sector, also cater to the needs of the civil 
sector. The value of production of the Defence PSUs during 
1993-94 has beenof the order of Rs. 4.091.08 crore 
(provisional). 
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) set up in 1964 
with its corporate office at Bangalore has 12 divisions 
locatedin six states. The principal functions of the 
company is to design, manufacture, repair and overhaul 
various types of aircraft, helicopters and related 
aero-engines, avionics, instruments and accessories. HAL is 
currently manufacturing Jaguar, Dornier-228 and MiG-27M 
aircraft. Cheetah and Chetak helicopters and various types 
of aero-engines. HAL is also engaged in the design and 
development of an Advanced Light Helicopters (ALH)). 
Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) was established in 
1954. Presently, it is the country's premier electronics 
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organisation, having nine manufacturing units located at 
Bangalore, Madras, Hyderabad, Machilipatnam, Pune, Taloja, 
Panchkula, Ghaziabad and Kotdwara. Its corporate office is 
at Bangalore. BEL is engaged in the design/development and 
manufacture of sophisticated, state-of-the-art electronic 
equipments for the use of defence services and 
para-military organisations. Other users are All India 
Radio, Doordarshan, Department of Telecommunications, 
Police, Meterological Department etc. It has wide range of 
over 350 different products, comprising of communication 
equipment, radars for military and civil use, optical and 
opto-electronic equipments, sound and vision broadcasting 
equipment and electronic components. 
Bharat Earth Movers Limited (BEML) commenced its 
operations in January 1965., It has three modern production 
units at Bangalore, Kolar Gold Fields and Mysore, a 
subsidiary foundry unit in Tarikere (Karnataka). Its 
corporate office is at Bangalore. The company is presently 
engaged in the design, development and manufacture of a 
wide range of sophisticated equipments and systems, 
particularly earth moving machines, rail coaches, track 
laying equipments, heavy duty trucks, trailers, diesel 
I'i 
engines, etc. BEML is a leader in earth moving industry 
withover 70 per cent market share. Its equipments and 
systems are productively deployed in India and over 30 
other countries across the globe. 
Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL) established in 1970 is 
primarily engaged in the manufacture of guided missiles and 
allied equipments. It has units at Hyderabad and Bhanur 
(Medak District). Its corporate office is at Hyderabad . It 
is also the prime production agency for manufacture of four 
new missile systems, namely, Prithvi, Trishul, Akash and 
Nag, being devleoped indigenously. Its activities which had 
earlier been diversified into a number of Naval project, 
now proposes to take up manufacture of 7.62 mm self-loading 
rifles (SLRs) and 9 mm pistols. 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) 
was established in 1958 by amalgamating Defence Science 
Organisation and some of the technical development 
establishments. 
The notable development successesof the Department 
include flight simulators for aircraft, 68 mm reusable 
15 
rocket pod for aircraft, brake parachute for fighter 
aircraft, light field gun, charge line mine clearing system 
for safe passage of vehicles in the battlefield, 
illuminating ammunition for enchancing night fighting 
capabilities, cluster weapons system for fighter aircraft, 
naval mines and new generation bombs for high speed 
aircraft and low-level bombing. Different raders like 
low-level tracking rader Indra-I and Indra-II for Army and 
Airforce, light field artillery rader battlefield 
surveillancerader, secondary surveillance radar have been 
developed. Bridge layer tank-Kartik, military bridging 
systems, advanced ship sonar systems, advanced sonobuoy, 
naval decoys, naval simulators, torpedo launchers, advanced 
materials and composites for military applications and 
parellel processing computer for aerodynamic computations 
are also some of other achievements of the Department. 
The main battle tank Arjun having superior fire 
power, high mobility and excellent protection has been 
successfully developed. Army has accepted the tank for 
induction in Service and is now under troop trials in 
actual field conditions. Simultaneously, planning action 
has been initiated by Department of Defence Production and 
Supplies for productionisation of MBT-Arjun. 
A Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) which would 
incorporate modern design concepts and several 
state-of-the-art technologies, is under hardware 
fabrication and engineering stage and integration of some 
of the sub-assemblies has already commenced. An advanced 
technology gas turbine entgine GTX-35VS named Kaveri for 
use in LCA is under development under a separate programme 
Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) 
comprising of four missile systems namely Prithvi 
surface-to-surface tactical battlefield missile; Akash 
medium range surface-to-air missile; Trishul short range 
surface-to-air missile and Nag third generation anti-tank 
missile; in progress. The programme also includes 
development of a re-entry technology demonstrator project 
called Agni. The different missiles haveundergorjeguccessful 
flight trials, proving number of sub-systems. The other 
major programmes which are in advanced stage of 
development/production are pilotless target aircraft (PTA). 
composite sonar and tectical weapon continue system 
Panchendriya for Navy, marineacoustic research ship, a new 
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family a small arms (rifle, LMG, carbine) in 5.56 ram 
calibre, a multi-barrel rocks launching system Pinaka and a 
multi-function phased array radar Rajendra. 
The Department has also rendered assistance to 
para-military and police agencies by way of supply of 
bullet proof vehicles, bullet proof vests, amenity vehicles 
such as kitchen lorry, communication equipment, water 
pressure jet based anti-riot vehicles and several other 
types of equipments. It also offen specialised training at 
its two premier traininginstitutions namely institute of 
Armament Technology (LAT), Pune and Defence Institute of 
Technology Management (DITM), Mussoorie. The courses at 
these institutions have been evolved primarily to meet the 
needs of DRDO, Department of Defence Production and 
Supplies and three Services. 
IS 
Threat Perceptions 
China continues to be perceived by Indians as the 
primary strategic challenge, while Pakistan remains a 
troublesome neighbours that initiatied three regular wars, 
not to talk of the proxy war in Northwest, India since 1982, 
Since 1987, relations with China have shown marked 
improvement; the 1993 agreement to maintain peace and 
tranquality on the borders (on the basis of mutual and equal 
security) represented what is perhaps the first conventional 
force reduction agreement in Asia. In August this year, both 
countries agreed to withdraw from two posts on the 
contentious northeast Himalayan border, the scene of border 
incidents in 1986-87, where the two armies had maintained 
eye-ball to eye-ball contact for more than three decades. 
This had been a refreshing, even if less noticed, contrast 
with the tensions in the South Chin Sea, and China's 
worsening relations with the US and Taiwan. 
The way China, already the largest military power in 
the region, evolves in the future will most certainly 
influence peace and stability in the region. Although India 
does not currently perceive a threat of military conflict 
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with China, there is clearly cause for concern in the years 
ahead; China's qualitative military modernisation, the 
continuous upgrading of nuclear and missile arsenals, the 
growth of China's power projection capabilities are 
worrisome to many countries in the region and is closely 
observed in India. 
Pakistan's ideological thrust drives its policies in 
support of armed militancy and civil war in the territories 
of its neighbours to its west and east. Pakistan had lost to 
proxy war in Kashmir by 1992, and since then faces the 
problem of successful digengagement without destablising 
fallout on the domestic political scene. The ideological 
conflict between Pakistan and India is unlikely to subside 
in the coming years. India is likely to continue to respect 
the 1972 Simla Agreement which transformed the ceasefire 
line in Jammu and Kashmir into a de-facto border and which 
requries both sides not to disturb this line, and to settle 
the problems bilaterally through peaceful means. Pakistan 
now follows a formally announced military doctrine of 
"offensive-defence". 
The most serious problem for peace and security in the 
sub-continent, on the other hand, emanates from the 
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potential for the implosion of the state of Pakistan. Such a 
development would be extremely adverse to India's strategir-
and security interests. Meanwhile, the conflict in the 
Siachen region remains contained, but with little sign of 
resolution unless Pakistan is willing to formalise the 1989 
agreement on a mutually agreed line of actual ground 
positions held by the two sides on the Saltoro ridge west of 
the Siachen Glaciers. 
China, Central Asian states, Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia and Iran possess ballistic missiles which have 
the range to reach India. Over 26,000 surface-to-surface 
missiles have been fired during wars since 1944, all of them 
with conventional warheads; in every case the result was a 
strong political and even military response. No crediable 
defence against ballistic missiles in likely to be available 
operationally, except to the US, for many years. This 
generates a need for defence through deterrence. It is in 
this context that the 150/ 250km range Prithvi missile has 
been developed, and the 1,500km range Agni has been 
demonstrated. The battlefield fire-support Prithvi missile 
is scheduled to be inducted into service this year. 
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STEPS FOR FUTURE 
It is in the context of this projection of future tht 
the minister unveiled his plans for defence. Though the 
armed forces would not be expanded, steps will necessarily 
have to be taken to modernize and upgrade present military 
technology. 
The first step would be to strengthen cooperation 
between India and the US. This means India will acquire 
electronic warfare equipment and have more military officers 
exchange with the US. 
Second, there is need for self-reliance in defence 
procurement since the scarcity of foreign exchange precludes 
the possibility of heavy armament imports. The Defence 
Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), which at 
present gets 4.3 percent of the defence budget, will be 
further geared to meet defence needs. 
Third, defence exports will be accelerated to offset 
the grim balance of payments position. The annual export 
target set for defence is Rs. 400 crore against Rs. 83 crore 
in 1990-91. Defence items identified for exports include 105 
Indian field gun (MK-II), electronics and communication 
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equipment, land and sea mines and idigenous armour and 
artillery amunition. 
Fourth, navy, which at present gets 13.4 percent of 
defence outlay, will receive greater priority. Mr. Pawar has 
justified the need for another aircraft carrier on the 
ground that it provides integral air support to the fleet. 
Acquisition of a nuclear-powered submarine is also not ruled 
out. 
Fifth, the tail or combat support logistics arm, which 
has nearly 42 percent of the forces strength, will be 
streamlined. 
And lastly, the Defence Minister informed Parliament 
that the government would evolve a national security policy. 
NEED FOR NSC 
With an eye on global developments and domestic 
position, what is urgently needed is a National Security 
Council (NSC) which could evolve a long-term national 
perspective that could define national goals on the basis of 
existing geo-politico-economic considerations. The national 
aim will determine national strategy and subsequently 
underline the defence policy. 
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Earlier attempts at Co-ordinated planning have not 
been very successful. The formation of the NSC, announced by 
the V.P. Singh government, has remained as a proposal. 
The result is haphazard armaments purchases, which 
ignores long-term perspective planning. The consequence has 
been to spur the arms race in the sub-continent. 
To a considerable extent, the inability to take a 
long-term view on security matters has been aided by a 
paranoic obsession with secrecy. 
Similarly, reports of committees, set up to go into 
various aspects of defence management, have not been made 
public, precluding the possibility of any enlightened debate 
on the issues. The recent Arun Singh committee report which 
went into ways to make the services cost-effective, is 
unlikely to ever see the light of day. 
The consequence of such secrecy is that it is 
difficult to form an opinion of the efficiency with which 
defence finances are managed. 
Such suspicion is grounded in the fact that defence 
procurement from ordnance factories and public sector 
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undertakings always cost several times more thanit would 
have, had it been procured from the private sector. 
While defence service bemoan the paucity of funds, 
revised budget estimates show that in 1989-90, Rs. 20.8 
crore, Rs. 17.81 crore, and Rs. 31.34 crore remained 
unutilized by the army, the navy and the defence and 
ordnance stores respectively. 
PRESENT NEEDS 
There is need for greater involvement in financial 
management by the service chiefs who are responsible for the 
lines of their troops and maintenance of equipment worth 
crores. Today, financial control rests with bureaucrats who 
are not held accountable for thenation's defence 
preparedness. 
Similarly, the lack of co-ordination between the 
services and the ordanance factories that work under the 
administrative jurisdiction of the bureaucrats in the 
defence ministry in such that there is oftena mismatch 
between the requirements of the army and the production 
profile of ordnance factories. The result is not only that 
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resources used in such infructuous production is rendered 
waste; it also implies the immobilization of equipments 
acquired at considerable costs. 
Fiscal decentralisation that gives the services 
headquarters, the freedom to range their financial affairs 
would pre-empt problems of this kind. This recommendation is 
also under stood to have been made by the Arun 
Singh Committee, which also recommended that service chiefs 
have financial powers similar to that conferred on 
secretaries to the government. 
Missiles : 
The principal means of delivering nuclear charges to 
the objects to be destroyed; missiles are unmanned airborne 
vehicles, either guided or unguided while in Trajectory, and 
moved by reactive force. According to their roles, missiles 
are subdivided into the following classes; air-to-air, 
air-to-ground, ground-to-ground, ship-to-share etc. 
Air-to-air missiles are armed missiles installed in airborne 
vehicles, and used against aerial targets. According to 
their guidance systems, air-to-air missiles may use 
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autonomous guidance, remote control, homing or a combination 
of these. Air-to-ground missiles are armed missiles launched 
from airborne vehicles, and intended todistroy ground 
targets. According to their design, air-to-ground missiles 
are divided into the cruse and ballistic categories. 
Air-to-ship missiles are armed missiles launched from 
airborne vehicles, and used to destroy warships. Missiles of 
the ground-to- ground class may be strategic, operational 
tactical, and tactical anned missiles, intended to destroy 
ground targets from the ground ship-to-air-missiles are 
armed missiles launched from shipboard launchers to destroy 
enemy air targets. Ship-to-shore class missiles are 
ballistic or cruise missiles fired by submarines and surface 
ships to destroy enemy coastal installations. Ship-to-ship 
missiles constitute the armament of missile-armed vessels 
(submarines and surface ships,) and are used to destroy 
enemy warships and merchant vessels. Ship-to-ship missiles 
have a homing system. Sometimes they are used to distroy 
coastal installations. 
Guided Missile 
Missiles which are guided in flight with the aid of 
special guidance systems (autonomous, remote-control, 
homing, and combined systems). 
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Ground-to- Air Guided Missile 
A type of missile in the ground-to-air class, intended 
for anti- aircraft (or anti-missile) defence. The flight of 
a ground-to-air guided missile is controlled from the ground 
the moment of launching until it approaches the zone of the 
target. The charge is detonated with the aid of a 
radio-detonator installed in the missile itself. Such a 
guided missile may be armed with a conventional or a nuclear 
charge. 
Unguided Missile 
Missiles not having an on-board guidance system. 
Direction and range are imported to such missiles by the 
launcher. 
Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missile 
An air-to-surface ballistic missile fired from a 
missile carrying aircraft or from any airborne platform, and 
intended to hit targets on land or water. 
INDIAN MISSILES: FACTS AT A GLANCE 
AGNI 
Type; Intermediate range ballistic missile 
Range: 1,200-2,000km 
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Propulsion: First stage solid propellant motor, second 
stage twin engined liquid fuel motor and two auxilliary 
propulsion systems. 
Guidance: Strapdown inertial navigation system using 
explicit guidance scheme. 
Length: 19 meters 
Launch weight. 14.2 tonnes 
Payload: Maximum 1 tonne. The technology cfemonstration 
project Agni, has proved India's capability in terms of 
developing the carbon-carbon ablative head shield used in 
the re-entry vehicle and the inertial navigation system, 
which is also shared by Prithvi, with minor modifications. 
The closed-loop strap-down INS installed inboth the 
missiles uses accelerometers and gyroscopes which feed the 
on-board computers with information about the progression on 
all three axes. These computers then steer the vehicle along 
its charrted path by correcting any anomalyon course. 
Also, by employing position-correcting 
reaction-control systems, using velocity trimming modules, 
both Prithvi and Agni have achieved remarkable accuracy-due 
to gyro drift and uncertainties in gravitational field 
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vectors, usually significant errors take place in the course 
of the ballistic missile flight path. And once the DRDO 
scientists perfect the terminal guidance system, that 
accuracy is slated to improve even further. 
Added to this arsenal now is the 60 km range 'Astra'. 
An air-to-air missile, the Astra is still on the drawing 
board stage. But once deployed, it could parallelthe 
characteristics of America's top-of-the pile AMRAAM 
(advanced medium range air-to-air missile). 
AKASH 
Type: Medium range surface to air missile. 
Range: Maximum 25 km 
Propulsion: First stage solid fuel booster motor and 
second stage ram-rocket sustainer motor. 
Guidance: Command guidance from ground radar system 
and on-board precision booming system. 
Warhead: Pre-fragmented warhead activated by proximity 
fuse. 
The PAR is just one of the sophisticated systems that 
makes Akash, the medium range surface-to-air missile, the 
most ambitions SAM project being undertaken by the DRDO. In 
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fact, it is the Akash-successfully flight-tested on August 
14,1990, which offers India the unique opportunity of 
catching up with the only anti-tactical ballistic missile 
(ATBM) system in the world-the now famous Patriot system. 
This 25 km range, two stage missile uses Ram-rocket 
propulsion-the missile carries no oxidising material and 
uses an air-breathing engine to whip up its enormous energy. 
Also, to insure against "electronic finger-printing" the 
Akash comes equipped with extensive ESM (electronic counter 
measure) systems, which have been fed into themind of the 
missile. 
For multiple target track and engagement capability, 
Akash uses several thousand ferrite C-band phase shifters on 
different frequencies. Just how important the break-through 
was became clear when the National Research and Development 
Corporation awarded the team that developed the 
electronically-variable ferrite phase shifters-the heart of 
thephased array radar technology-its highest honour. When 
ready, the radar will be produced by BEL. However, to 
increase the accuracy even further, a separate terminal 
guidance package is also being developed. 
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NAG 
Type: Third generation, 'fire and forget' anti-tank 
guided missile with the unique capability of hitting a tank 
fromthe top. 
Range: 4 km 
Propulsion: Solid propellant motor 
Guidance: Initial guidance from launcher's target 
acquisition system and terminal guidance by on board 
millimetric wave (active) or imaging infra-red (passive) 
seekers. The missile chases, the target whereverit goes. 
Warhead: Tandem-shaped charges. 
Nag, the third generation anti-tank missile also 
compares favourably with any such system in the world. Armed 
with "fire and forget" and "to-attack" capabilities, the 
missile earned its spus in a test flight on November 29, 
1990. 
With its 4-6 km range, the Nag employs mercury cadmium 
telluride as a sensing element inits passive imaging 
infrared system, with an alternate millimetric wave (MMW) 
seeker. 
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PRITHVI 
Type: Surface-to- surface battlefield tactical missile 
Range: Maximum 250 km, minimum 40 km 
Propulsion: Single stage, twin liquid fuel motor. 
Guidance: Strapdown inertial navigation system. 
Control is maintained by an on-board computer linked to 
hydraulic actuators that move the engines which are mounted 
on gimbles. 
Length: 8.5 meters. 
Warheads: High explosive pre-pragmented and bombiet. 
Prithvi, the medium-range surface-to-surface missile, 
was recently successfully test flown from Sriharikota and 
will soon enter production at Bhart Dynamics Limited, 
Hyderabd. The missile will be mounted on an eight-wheeled 
kolos truck, the teleporter erector-launcher (TEL;. Prithvi 
Single stage, two chamber rocket motor uses DRDL's storable 
liquid propellant REMA (red fuming nitric oxide) and G-fuel 
(xylidine). The missile can be steered in all three axes 
using thrust-vector control . 
In addition, Prithvi derives its smooth and 
trouble-free flight characteristics from the utilisation of 
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hypergolic propellent resulting in easy rocket motor 
burnout. 
TRISHUL 
Type: Low level, quick reaction, surface-to-air 
missile. 
Range: 500 meters to 9 km 
Propulsion: Single solid fuel motor 
Import content: 6 per cent eventually 
Guidance: Command guidance from an under ground system 
and an on-board computerised control system. 
Warhead: Pre-fragmented warhead with a strike radius 
of 20 metres. 
The short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) Trishul, 
promises to be the most ubiquitous of all DRDO missiles, as 
it has the entire spectrum of applications open to it. Apart 
from being an effective SAM sy;stem, Trishul is also a good 
anti-sea-skimmersea-skimmers are anti-ship missiles that 
skim on the sea surface as they speed towards the target. 
Today Trishul has been earmarked for utilisation in all the 
three defence forces. Out wardly resembling the Soviet Sa-8" 
Gecko" missile, Trishul is made of flow-formed aluminium 
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alloy sections and consists of a fibre-reinforced plastic 
radome which processes information for an extremely quick 
reaction time. Though initial production will begin with the 
missile slaved to the HAS" Flycatcher" radar, later models 
with boast of a phased-array radar (PAR) for multiple 
target-tracking and command guidance of several missiles 
simultaneously. 
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DEFENCE POLICY 
NAKRA (D S) . Trimming the fat. Seninar. 383; 1991, July; 
41-4. 
The shortages or shortfalls and shortcomings within 
the defence services are qualitative rather than 
quantitative. There is no shortage of manpower but the 
traditional grit and morale of the services has been 
gradually waning .. Disposals in defence equipment are 
bound to be large. The protracted procedure of disposal 
involves holding onto junk which statistical projections 
show as serviceable; a suicidalmirage. Over the years the 
defence structure has become top heavy.On the civil side, 
the Defence Ministry should be an effective policy and" 
planning organizationmanned by experienced and capable 
officers. 
PARANJPE (S). India's defence policy: New perspectives. 
Indian Journal of Strategic Studies. 17; 1992; 32-42. 
In conventional terms,India is the only country in 
the Asia-Pacific region (Other than China; that possesses 
as much military power.India's airforce deploys some 700 
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combat aircraft including the latest soviet MIG-29; Anglo 
French deep strike bomber, Jaguar; the fighter etc.India has 
a 1.2 million man army which includes two armoured 
divisions deploying the Soviet T-72 tanks. Indian navy is 
also emerging a powerful force with two aircraft carriers, 
a squadron of Sea-Harriers and nuclear powered submarine 
(on loan from Russia). Equally significant is the 
extensive defence production base. The Hindustan Aircraft 
Limited (HAL; is reported to start production of Mig 29 
under licence. The facilities for production of tanks and 
those at ship building are equally significant. 
SANJIV PRAKASH. Indian defence: A conscious attempt at 
pragmatism. Defence and Foreign Affairs. 18,4; 1990, 
April; 12-8. 
V.P. Singh, a former Defence Minister of India, 
came to power recently as the country's new Prime Minister 
and Minister of Defence with the clear vision of achieving 
more pragmatic security and strategic policies. This, in a 
country which views defence as the essence of national 
prestige, meant moving defence toward an age of, modern, 
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professional management. Integrated defence planning, long 
the norm among major powers, was never a major factor in 
India. The National Front Government's aproach may finally 
achieve this objective. 
SRIVASTAVA (HK). Revolution in military affairs and 
approaches to our defence policy and conventional force 
architecture: A strategic debate. Strategic Studies Journal. 
7; 1994; 18-28. 
There is no doubt that India has a variety of arms 
in its weapon inventory, and has shown capability to take 
on armed conflict, if forced. Its expertise in 
high-attitude, snow bound theater has earned her respect 
from highly technical armies of the world. Reconstitution 
entails the ability to deploy a credible defence faster 
than adverseary could generate an over whelming offence. 
"The ability to reconstitute is a function of the 
maintenance of a quality defence industrial base, 
technological superiority in key areas and military 
leadership and warfighting skills". 
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5. TANHAM (George). Indian strategic culture. Indian Defence 
Review.7^2^992, April; 39-46. 
India from a subcontinental and national 
perspective, has almost always been on the strategic 
defensive. Since its early history, India has been seen as 
a rich region, and outsiders from the barren areas of 
Central Asia have streamed in seldom encountering anything 
like unified opposition. The various states almost never 
cooperated with ech other or coordinated their efforts in 
the defence of India itself; they fought only for 
themselves and sometimes allied with theinvaders against 
their internal rivals. India, as a large and proud nation, 
has from the time of its independence tried to persue a 
policy that would allow it as much independence of action 
and self reliance as posssible. 
, ANALYSIS 
6. MARSHALL (S L A ) . Are we logistically prepared? Defence 
Today. 4,2; 1996, April-June; 256-62. 
The proven close interdependence of strategy and 
logistics suggests that the shape, concept and design of 
the logistic system should be derived from the concept of 
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operations and the visualised design of battle. The recent 
changes in strategic thinking suggest a dissuasive 
deterrent posture against Pakistan, backed up by a 
graduated response executed through offensive defence. The 
peace and Tranquillity Treaty has pushed the threat from 
China to the back seat for some time. A total systems 
approach at national level, is inescapable to retain 
logistic effectiveness in the Armed Forces to meet the 
challenges of a future conflict. 
7. MUKERJEE (Dilip).Sufficient defence: Need for a national 
consensus. Times of India. 154, 175; 1991, July 24;8; b-d. 
It is now clear even to the most ardent champions of 
a military strong India that defence expenditures have to 
be slowed down because of the magnitude of the economic 
crisis facing the country. But they are fighting a 
r-T-ii-^ u-ard battle in a bid to persuade the 
political leadership as far as possible. There is no 
denying that the Peace we have enjoyed for almost 20 years 
now, the longest since independence, owes a great deal to 
the deterrent capability built up by the armed forces. In 
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many ways therefore the Indian security environment is 
much better today than it has been for a long time. 
, AIR FORCE 
8. RANBIR SINGH. lAF: Well equipped? Well trained? Well 
prepared? Defence Seminar. 5, 2-3; 1996, April; 9-12. 
Logically, the first factor in our defence equation 
is the correct perception and definition of the likely 
threat scenarios. This factor determines the kind of 
defence procurements we should go for iriprder to be able 
to counter the perceived threats. Our credible defence 
inventory coupled with meaningful training goes to define 
the level of our preparedness to be able to guard our 
boarders. If, in the first instance, our threat perception 
is wrong, the rest of the answers are obviously going to be 
wrong and let you down when you are called upon to 
perform in a kind of scenario you had not perceived or 
created for. 
, , COST ACCOUNTING, 
9. KARUNAMAYA (K). Costing in the Indian air force; Its 
immediate necessity and likely effectiveness. Trishul. 
8,1; 1995, Autumn; 5-15. 
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Due to the resource crunch and competing demands 
from various factors of the economy, it has become 
imperative that the government use tools of management 
accounting in its finance functioning. Cost accounting is 
one such tools and its importance cannot be wished away. 
But so far this fact has missed the minds of people at 
responsible levels in the bureaucracy. In the lAF the 
present costing system, though in place for twenty years 
has not been widely accepted nor have its benefits been 
widely publicised. Organisational resistance, individual 
aversion, inertia and above all lack of awareness, have 
resulted in cost accounting in the lAF, not really taking 
off. In other words, the organnisation has not benefited 
by the existence of this very important management tool . 
This needs to be corrected if the lAF desires to be a lean 
and mean fighting force. 
, , FIGHTERS 
10. JOSHI (J P). Employment of combat air powerln the Indian 
context. Trishul. 8,2; 1996, spring ,-1-10 . 
Considering the limited number of airpower assets 
available with us and all that has been said thus far, the 
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best employmemt of air power should be in consonance 
with the Principles of war, and in a manner that produces 
thelargest returns towards the achievement of the national 
aim. A top down approach would pay the best dividends. Air 
power should thus be employed to accomplish strategic, 
operational and finally tactical roles. No nation 
including India, is ever likely to have adequate airpower 
to meet all its needs. This being so, there is a need that 
roles, and within roles the employment of airpower, would 
always have to be prioritised to acieve themaximum 
pay-offs from the available assets. This demands a high 
degree of understanding of airpower, and an equally high 
degree of jointmanship. 
, effect on NEIGHBOURING STATES 
11. CRONIN (Richard P). India's growing military might worries 
its neighbours. Defence Journal. 16,6; 1990, June;19-24. 
As important as the size and effectiveness of its 
military forces in India's extensive indigenous production 
base. A giant public sector enterprise, HindustanAircraft 
Limited (HAL) has manufactured hundreds of MiG - 21s using 
Soviet transferred technology. HAL now assembles MiG-27s 
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largely from soviet-supplied parts and reportedly will 
produce the MiG-29 under license. HAL is seeking U.S. 
participation in the development of an indigenous light 
combat aircraft, for which purpose india has purchased 
llGEF-404 engines and has negotiated with U.S. companies 
for design support and aircraft subsystems. As a 
consequence, Indian policymakers tend to see a domestic 
political dimension to every disturbance in a neighbouring 
country, while the neighbours themselves see an 
injustifiably obsessive Indian interest in their own 
internal affairs. 
, , , LIGHT COMBAT AIRCRAFT 
12. BEDI (Rahul). Air-forces update: About turn for India. 
Jane's Defence Weekly .22,24; 1994, December 17,-19. 
The Indian Air Force (lAF) is under pressure. More 
thanhalf its ageing fleet faces retirement over the next 
five years, funds for updated replacements remain scarce 
and the indigenous hope - The Light Combat Aircraft (LCA)-
seems a distant and almost mythical prospect. To compound 
matters. The lAF has to confront an overall lack of 
strategic thinking and must operate within a system where 
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the military and government are invariably at variance, 
unable to execute or initiate any long-term planning. They 
also have to deal with what the military regards as an 
uninformed bureaucracy at the Ministeryof Defence (MOD) 
that is inexperienced in military matters but is the final 
arbiter of all resource and equipment allocations. 
13. GURUMURTHY (B N). Light combat aircraft: India's symbol of 
self-reliance. Yojana. 40,2; 1996, February; 25. 
The first Light combat Aircraft-LCA-designed and 
developed wholly indigenously, rolled out majestically at 
the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited in Bangalore. Apart 
from developing a complex and highly reliable weapon 
system that would meet the defence needs of the country in 
the early part of the next century, the LCA programme has 
also contributed in achieving a steep jump in the 
technological capabilities of the country. These 
capabilities have much wider applications beyond the 
combat aircraft development. The LCA will be a symbol of 
self-reliance of the 21st century India and will be a 
frontline weapon that the India Air Force can be proud of. 
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14. MAMA (Hormuz P) . India rides high: Light combat Aircraft 
is a first for Asian industry. Jane's intelligence 
Review-29; 1996, April. 57-9. 
The first Light combat Aircraft (LCAj technology 
demonstrator (TDI) was unveiled in November 1995 as 
India's new fighter. The LCA's primarily indigenous 
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airframe, engine and avionics make it Asia's first home 
grown" fourth generation fighter. This contrasts with the 
Japanese F-2 (FS-X), which is an upgraded F-16, and the 
Chinese Chengdu J-10, which will have Israeli Lavi 
technology and a Russian engine. "Technologically, it 
(LCA; is almost on a par with the Rafale and Eurofighter 
2000," said Kota Harinarayana, LCA program director at the 
Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA). Production costs 
are predicted to break even at 200 aircraft. Some Indian 
analysts believe the LCA can effectively replace all MiG 
fighters except the specialized MiG-25. 
15. NATIONAL SECURITY council. Democratic World. 22,10; 1993, 
May 31; 7-8. 
The National Security Council (NSC) which had been 
hibernating for the last three years is to be revived, 
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Prime Minister P V Narasimha Rao informed the Lok Sabha. 
Replaying to the debate on the demands for grants relating 
to the Defence Minister, the Prime Minister reaffirmed the 
Government's commitment to the Light Combat Aircraft 
(LCA) programme, announcing that the combinet had approved 
the programme a week ago. He also assured the House that 
the Government would ensure the highest levels of defence 
preparedness despite resource crunch. The Prime Minister 
said the Cabinet had cleared the LCA on April 20 and "The 
Air Force was committed to the LCA". The multi-role high 
performance LCA would replace the MIG-21s which formed 70 
per cent of the fleet at present. The first flight of the 
LCA should take place in June 1996. 
16. THOMAS (J). Light combat aircraft project. Indian Defence 
Review. 8,2; 1993,April; 64-7. 
The foreign exchange component alone of the LCA 
would be more than the total cost of a Mirage 2000, Mig 29 
or F 16. These three aircraft represent mature technology, 
each o^f them is in service with us or our neighbours: and 
each o'f them have superior weapons systems than the LCA. 
50 
One glamourous, high technology project will not do much to 
advance aeronautics in India. Infact the lavish release of 
foreign exchange and the demand to produce the "latest and 
the best" aircraft induces our engineers to look abroad 
and import everything. Thus the LCA project is counter 
productive in terms of foreign exchange and self reliance. 
It is very important that the LCA project abides by its 
originalaims, i.e. designing an indigenous, low cost light 
combat aircraft. 
^ , , COLLABORATION, USA 
17. MAHAPATRA (Chintamani). US proposal for defence 
cooperation. Current Topics. 17,12; 1991, December; 736-41 
A week after India's Chief of Army Staff, General 
S.F. Rodrigu,e's departure for New Delhi after a 
fortnight's visit to the US, the Pentagon leaked to the 
Press a set of proposals pertaining to an "enchanced 
levelof service to service contacts and exchanges" between 
the military establishments of the United States and 
India. Efforts by the Indian and American governments in 
recent years to improve cooperation in co-production of 
certain defence related items is a notejworthy development. 
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In fact, joint collaboration in the manufacture of a Light 
Combat Aircraft has already started. The prototype of this 
aircraft is likely to be ready by next year and the 
aircraft may be available for use by the Indian Air Force 
by 1994-95. 
18. THOMAS (Ra]u GC). U.S. Transfers of "dual use" 
technologies to India. Asian Survey. 30,9; 1990, 
September; 825-45. 
On October 11,1986, a high level pentagon 
delegation led by Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger 
visited New Delhi to negotiate the transfer of military 
related technology from the United Sates to India. Until 
1985 two thirds of India's defence technological 
cooperation was with the Soviet Union, and much of the 
rest with Western Europe. The Indo-American technological 
dialogue between 1986 and 1989 involved, among other 
things the transfer of three main items; advanced 
aero-engines for the development of a Light Combat 
Aircraft; satellite and booster rocket technology for 
India's space program; and supercoirputers for weather 
forecasting. All three items are at the forefront of 
American defence and civilian technology. 
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, ^ , , MIG-21 
19. MEHTA (Ashok K). Soviet connection. Sunday. 22,6; 1995, 
February 11; 76-7. 
The banner-Happy 1995- is still aflutter in Vayu 
Bhavan. What is missing is; thanks to Mikoyan Bureau and 
Moscow Aircraft Production Organisation (MAPO), For it's 
they who will retro-modify the Indian Air Force's (lAF) 
MIG-21 Bus fleet in the next two years, stretching its 
operational longevity to well beyond the next century, 
thus enabling the mirage of the Light Combat Aircraft 
(LCA; to catch up. A five-year programme of cooperation in 
defence technology and spare parts production was clinched 
last month with the Russian Prime Minister. Not everyone 
in the air force is happy about returning to the Russian 
fold when former soviet allies like Poland, Slovakia, the 
Czech Republic and even Israel may be better partners. 
, , , SUKHOI-30, PURCHASE, RUSSIA 
20. DHAR (A K). Moscow pushes India to finalise Sukhoi fighter 
deal. Pioneer. 6, 250; 1996, September 9;9;a-C 
Russia is pushing India to finalise the deal->n the 
purchase of 40 Sukhoi-30 multirole fighters for the Indian 
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Air Force which was decided by the previous Congress 
Government. The long range Su-30 multirole fighter would 
replace the ageing MiG- 23's and MiG-27's in the Indian 
Air Force of Russian Origin. The 1.8 billion dollar deal 
for the state-of- the-art Sukhoi-30 aircraft was decided 
by the earlier Congress regime, headed by P.V. Narasimha 
Rao, which signed a letter of intent on the deal and paid 
$200 million as advanced earlier this year. The lAF, 
considered to be world's fourth largest air force 
consisting mostly of soviet made MiG fighters, badly 
requires replacement for its ageing fleet. Defence 
analysts say Sukhois which have air-to-air refuelling 
capability, would enable the lAF to penetrate deep into 
enemy territory and add punch to its fire power. 
21. INDIA RECONSIDER Su-30 package. Strategic Digest. 26,6; 
1996, June; 947. 
The Indian government has revived negotiations with 
Russia for purchase of 32 Sukhoi-30 aircraft following a 
Russian offer to improve the estimated $ 270million 
aircraft package with updated armament avionics and 
support systems, according to defence officials. Last 
'1 
month, Russia, offered 150 new defence systems to India 
including air defence systems, anti-tank guided missiles, 
artillery systems and ammunition submarines, self guided 
torpedoes and multipurpose combat aircraft. The bulk of 
India's military arsenal is Russian made and the two 
countries signed an agreement last year to continue 
military and technological cooperation through 2000. 
^ , 1990s, THEORY 
22. GOLE (CV). Indian air power for the mid 1990s: Conceptual 
issues. Indian Defence Review. 7.3,- 1992, July; 32-6. 
It has taken nearly 70 years for defence experts 
and military planners to finally accept the pre-eminence 
of air power in any war planning. In India, the principle 
of united command of all air operations seems to be 
evenmore relevant for many additional reasons. Firstly, 
because the nature of the potential threat during the 
Nineties and their diverse assessments. Secondly, the 
paucity of resources and hence the need for joint 
operations to garner maximum air effort; and thirdly, 
inadequate infrastructure for communications and 
intelligence. Fourthly, misconceptions and 
5o 
misunderstandings still about the potential, practical 
application and effectiveness of air power. Last but not 
the least, parochial prejudices and interservice rivalries 
can jeopardise judicious and cost effective 
prioritization of targets to maximise results. 
, ARMAMENTS compared to PAKISTAN 
23. BRATERSKY (M V) and LUNYOV (S I). India at the end of the 
century. Asian Survey. 30,10; 1990, October; 927-42. 
In the 1970's, India became a center of force in 
the South Asian subcontinent; in the 1980s it became a 
regional naval power. The 1990s will be the decade in 
which India emerges as a major regional power of Asia. A 
comparison of Indian and Pakistani military power shows 
India's superiority in all major components. Indian army 
strength is 2.5 times greater than that of Pakistan; India 
has twice as many planes, 1.7 times as many tanks, and 1.6 
times as much artillery. Moreover, the military technology 
at the disposal of the Indian Air Force is much more 
sophisticated than that of Pakistan. The strained 
relations between the two cause India to keep some 
two-third of its land forces on their common border. 
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, , INDIGENOUS 
24. BANERJEE (D). Arms self-sufficiency; An Indian 
perspective. Strategic Analysis. 13,6; 1990, September; 
659-74. 
Achieving the goal of modernization in armaments 
within a restrictive defence budget is one of the most 
important challenges facing the defence planner in India 
today. The effort will require greater self-suff iciency, but 
at a reasonable price and within operationally acceptable 
time-frames. This will compel the Indian defence industry 
to modernize and become competitive internationally. A 
great deal of work is required from the users, the R&D 
organizations and the production agencies to bring this 
to fruition. Success in this endeavor will then determine 
India's position in the emerging internaional order. 
, ARMS INDUSTRY 
25. GUPTA (Amit). Indian arms industry. Asian Survey. 30,9; 
1990, September; 846- 61. 
India today has one of the world's largest military 
forces; a million men inarms an air force of more 
than 800 combat aircraft.,a navy with 60 combat vessels and 
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an inventory of 3,100 tanks. With more than 80 defence 
production and research units (36 ordanance factories, 8 
defence public sector under takings, and 40 defence 
research laboratories), India also has one of the largest 
arms industries in the non-Western world and, at the same 
time is among the five largest importers of armaments in 
the world today. This is due to the fact that the Indian 
arms industry still remains a producer of licensed 
weaponry. 
, ARMY 
26. CHERIAN (John), Fighting fit. Frontline. 13,4; 1996, March 
8; 4-8. 
The dramatic escalation of tension along the Line 
of Control in late-January and early-February, with 
Pakistani troops resorting to unprovoked firing; and other 
recent defence- related developments have once again 
refocussed national attention on security issues and the 
role of the Indian Army. New Challenges confront India's 
armed forces as they defend the country's security along 
14, 103 km of land border, including the 7,000 km borders 
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with Pakistan and China, and a 7,600 km coastline, and 
protect its interestsin 2.5 million sq km of the Exclusive 
Economic Zone. In addition, more than 500 islands and 
offshore hydrocarbon installations are to be protected. 
The Himalayas in the North, the jungles in the East and 
the North-East and the deserts and the swamps in the West, 
together make up one of the most difficult terrains that 
any army has to operate in. 
27. DASGUPTA (Sunil). Peacekeeping: A profitable exercise. 
India Today. 19,3; 1995, February 15; 114-17. 
Danger, of course, is a part of the profession of 
arms, and the army, for the moment, is countingits gains. 
Says Bhagat, "Sri Lanka will be forgotten with the success 
in Somalia-but then Sri Lanka was a different story." For 
an army that has not fought an official war after 1971, 
achieved little in an unofficial one in Sri Lanka, and is 
just about beginning to recover ground from the militants 
in Kashmir, that is a reward in itself. With 36 wars, 
small and large, but mostly internal, raging in the world 
and many of them likely to require UN peacekeeping 
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in years to come, the demand for well- trained, 
disciplined, wiling and tough armies is bound to grow. And 
India is now well positioned to take advantage. 
, ARMOUR and INFANTRY 
28. NAIR (G Sudhakar). Indian armoured corps: A well oiled 
fighting machine. Democratic World. 20,24; 1991, June 16;12, 
Today, Indian battle tanks, with integrated air defence 
troops are capable of advancing through minefields and 
dealing with attack hilicopters or low flying aircrafts. 
Because of the technological advances and night driving 
and fighting devices, tanks no longer require infantry for 
close protection. The infantry combat vehicles also give 
an additional fighting edge to the Armoured corps. It is 
of greatuse of mobile operations at the rear of the army. 
, , , effect of MISSILES, ANTI-TANK 
29. ANSARI (N A). Armour operations versus anti-tank 
guided missiles. Indian Defence Review Digest. 3; 1992, 
March; 96-9. 
The arrival of smart ATGMs on the modern 
battlefield will , doubtless, impose caution and tactical 
GU 
awareness in the minds of the advancing mechanized forces 
in contrast to their cavalier attitude of yore. However, 
ATGMs, irrespective of their pedigree and generation, are 
not super weapons that will paralyse the movement of 
mechanized forces on the high-intensity battlefields of 
the future. ATGMs have certain inherent technical and 
tactical Limitations which should be exploited by 
mechanized forces. It is certain that ATGMs will exact a 
heavier toll than ever before, but it is equally possible 
for the mechanized forces to limit ATGM attrition rates to 
acceptable numbers by correct appreciation of terrain and 
the enemy, effective grouping of all elements of the 
combined arms force, evolving good battle drills to 
produce instant ATGM evasion manoeuvres, and lastly, but 
the most important of all, the organization of 
quick-reacting artillery and air support for delivering 
speculative, suppressive and neutralizing fire whenever 
and wherever required by the mechanized forces. 
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^ ^ ^ TANKS 
30. PRASANNAN (R). Laid to rust. Week. 13,20; 1995, May 7 ; 
29-36, 
In Indian Army needs about a hundred new tanks 
every year to replace the old ones. For the last few 
yearsit has been getting far fewer, and this year General 
Shankar Roy Chowdhary will get just 15. Worse still- there 
is not enough money even to buy cleaning and lubricating 
oil for the ageying machines. The last time India built a 
submarine was in 1991. The navy's two aircraft-carriers are 
old and creaking and beyond refit. The Indian Air Force 
will have no bomber in ten years, unless the ageing 
Jaguars are given a fresh coat of war point. Air Chief 
Marshal S.K. Kaul wants at least a third of his fleet to 
consist of multi-role aircraft by the end of the decade. 
Despite its large military, India is one of the least 
militarised states in the world. Its per capita defence 
expenditure is just $ 8.08 whereas Pakistan's is $ 31.65. 
31. SEN (Avirook). No room for manoeuvre. India Today. 21, 14; 
1996, July 31; 152-3. 
In numbers, India has the edge with around 3,400 
Main Battle Tanks {MBTs),but numbers don't tell the whole 
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story. For in that fleet are about 800 Russian T-55 tanks 
and 1,200 Vijayantas, which were first produced in 1965. 
Manufacturing the Arjun in numbers that will enable it to 
replace the entire fleet of T-55s and Vijayantas and take 
over the frontal role from the T-72s will prove costly, 
and probably unfioasible.As a senior DRDO Official says, "In 
the event of further delays or prohibitive costs, we may 
have to import MBTs or upgrade theT-72' fleet, "But with 
no modernisation or acquisitions for the past decade the 
Indian army seems to be losing the edge it had on paper. 
And probably on the ground as well. 
^ , , ^ MAIN BATTLE TANK (MBT) 
32. CHERIAN (John). Arming the army. Frontline. 13,4; 1996, 
March 8; 17-8. 
India's Main Battle Tank (MBT), Arjun, was cleared 
formally for mass production at a ceremony presided over 
by Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao on January 9. 
Supposed tro spearhead India's armour of the future, it will 
now go into production, after having seen a decade of 
research and stringent trials. The scientific Advisor to 
the Defence Minister, Dr. A.P.J, Abdul Kalam, said the 
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Arjun could now be counted among the three best MBTs in 
the world. Senior Army officials expect the Arjun to be 
inducted by 1998 at the earliest. There are still some in 
the armoured corps and mechanised divisions who are 
sceptical about the Arjun's performance and capabilities. 
There have been arguments that the Arjun is a hybrid set 
of largely imported systems and sub-systems which have 
failed to reach the specified levels required by an MBT. 
33. INDIA'S MAIN battle tank - Arjun. Indian Defence Review 
Digest. 1; 1992; 95-9. 
The Indian Army's most stringent specifications, 
MBT Arjun represents the translation of advanced design 
upto a reliable and effective weapon system to meet the 
varied threats of the nineties and beyond. Adopting most 
advanced technologies the Arjun offers the troops in the 
battle field, a state-of-the-art tank with superior 
fire power,high mobility and excellent protection. It has 
a computer-controlled integrated fire control system 
incorporating day-cum-night stabilized sighting system 
guarantees a very high first-round hit probability and 
reduced reaction time to bring effective fire on targets. 
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, , , , role of P0LITICS7 ELECTIONS. 
34. CHENGAPPA (Bindana M) . NSC, BJP, and MET, Centre 
for Defence Studies International Security Digest. 3,6; 
1996, March; 6-7. 
The Indian political leadership operates only with 
elections in mind. The opposition Bhartiya Janata Party 
(BJP) hasplans to play up national security as a dominant 
theme in its election manifesto for the forthcoming polls. 
Probably, it is this that has prompted the. Congress 
government to catalyse long delayed techno-military 
projects like the Light Combat, Aircraft (LCA) the 
Advances Light Helicopter (ALH) and the Arjun Main Battle 
Tank. (MBT). Now the Congress government-with three major 
defence technology projects taking some shape-will have a 
good counter to the proposed BJP attack over poor national 
security preparedness. 
, , PROBLEMS, POLITICISATION 
35. MUSHAHID HUSSAIN. Indian army's changing profile. Regional 
Studies. 9,3; 1991, Summer; 3-19. 
Three trends are pointers to the changing profile 
of the Indian Army. (1) The militarization of the Indian 
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state reflected in the deployment of almost one-third of 
Indian Army in quelling full-fledged insurgencies in 
Kashmir, Punjab and Assam. (2) The Hinduization of Indian 
demonstrated by erosion of secular values and rise of 
hindu chauvinism. (3) The overt politicization of senior 
retired Indian Army officers-about two dozen of whom 
joined the right-wing Hindu BJP alone in run-upi-o the 
elections in the summer of 1991 alone- demonstrates a 
certain frustration with the Indian Political scene, which 
has seen four Prime Ministers in 19 months. The failure of 
the Indian Army in Sri Lanka and the collapse of USSR, 
India's principal arms supplier, have added to the Indian 
of Army's problems. 
, role in CIVILIAN AFFAIRS 
36. GANGULY (Sumit;.From the defence of the nation to aid to 
the Civil: The army in contemporary India. Journal of 
Asian and African Studies. 26,1-2; 1991, January-April; 
11-26. 
Unlike many professional armies in the developing 
world the Indian Army has shown little or no interest in 
political involvement. During British colonial rule the 
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officers and the men of the army were socialized into 
accepting the notion of political neutrality. Independent 
India's politicians, most notably Jawaharlal Nehru, 
carefully reinforced this tradition. In the past few 
decades several developments have threatened this 
Nehruvian legacy. Increasing ethnolinguistic violence 
coupled with the venlity of loci police forces have led to 
increasing reliances on the Army to maintain civil order. 
More importantly, in a ethnically plural state like India, 
repeated use of the Army to quell communal violence 
threatens to politicize the Army. Inordinate reliance on 
the Army to maintain civil order may also help erode its 
long-standing tradition of political neutrality. 
37. KATHPALIA (P N). Use of the Indian armed forces in aid of 
civil authoriy. Indian Defence Review. 8,1; 1993, January;19-24 
Defence is probably the most intricate single 
branch of public policy of any kind even in a complex 
world of today. The whole nation is involved in it. 
Therefore, the problems faced by theArmed Forces cannot be 
separated from the national problems. The problems cannot 
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be compartmentalised into two different categories viz. 
political problems to be handled by politicians only 
andTtiilitary strategic problems to be solved by the Armed 
Forces Chiefs. A war starts as a result of a statemate in 
the political games played by the political leaders of the 
involved countries and the Armed Forces are used as an 
instrument to achieve the ultimate aims of the National 
Policy. 
, , role of POLITICIANS 
38. MADHOK (V K). Toning up defence: Politicians hold the key. 
Sunday Statesman. 130, 8619; 1991, June 9; 6;d. 
Many long and short-term defence issues of a 
critical nature-all concerned with the security and 
readiness of the armed forces-await The Goverment's 
attention. At least five of these deserve special notice. 
First, the crucial need for national cohesion at the 
political and military levels which cannot be achieved 
without a functional National Security Council and an 
effective defence intelligence system to support it. 
Secondly, the need for a long-term technological vision, 
including the Philosophy and manufacture of space support 
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systems with defence applications. Thirdly, manpower 
planning to include the building up of an effective 
technically-oriented officer corps. Fourth, national 
support systems to include defence production a drive for 
indigenization, logistics and its integration. And, lastly 
restructuring of the military forces and other 
organizations to include. The NCC, the Territorial Army 
has also the desirability of introducing a National 
Service Scheme. 
, , SOLDIERS 
39. PROUDFOOT (C L). Indian solidier; Cornerstone of our 
democracy. Indianpefence Review Digest. 1; 199 2; 9 3-4. 
Solidiers are a strange, distant breed of men 
fanatically worshipped in the brief periods of national 
danger and forgotten afterwards, especially when they doff 
their uniforms and become civilians again. There has never 
been compulsory military service in our country. It is in 
this environment that the morale of our Armed Forces and 
especially the Army must be considered. Today's jawan is 
no longer a gallant blockhead who is only ready "to do or 
die", through he works and lives within the limitations and 
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constructions of camp and discipline; he is a literate 
person with an inquiring mind and has access to all 
strata of the media. 
, ASSESSMENT 
40. MEHTA (Ashok K). All at sea. Sunday; 22,2; 1995, January 
14; 76-7. 
The Prime Minister does not appear to listen to 
himself as the defence minister. On 15 August, he said 
that national security is his government's No. 1 concern. 
Twice he has stated that the proposal for a National 
security Council (NSC) is being examined. But like the 
NSC, dozens of reports and proposals are gathering dust in 
bureaucratic closets. Reason: there is no full-time expert 
body to give non-partisan advice to the government on 
matters of defence and national security. In shorty there 
is no decision-making. In the absence of operational 
directives from the government, the respective chiefs of 
the armed forces do lip-reading. 
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, effect of GULF WAR 
41. GULF WAR: Some lessons for India. Democratic World. 20,8; 
1991, February 24; 5-6. 
The Indian military strategists will have to learn 
a lot of lessons from the Gulf War. Although many 
strategic experts including former Army Chief General 
Sunda'ji are coming out with daily analytical reports, all 
of them lack a total perception. Because of the lack of 
flow of information from the battle fields in Iraq, Kuwait 
and Saudi these experts are making wild congectures and 
predict some events. Perhaps they may be able to do some 
good work after the perilous war is over. A debate is 
going on in India on the nuclear andjmissile capabilities. 
Rajiv Gandhi has advocated rightly that India should 
immediately go in for nuclear arms. He has expressed 
concern that the Americans might use nuclear weapons 
because all other weapons had failed. India cannot wait 
now. 
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— , — , — , IRAQ 
42. MENON (Raja). India should avoid Iraq's blunders. Times of 
India. 159, 221; 1996, September 17;10; f. 
It would be a poor military observer in this 
country who does not heed the lessons of the US Vs Iraq 
scenario. India deserves better for it has brilliant 
rocket scientists who can deliver the weapons system of 
the future which is certainly not the Prithivi or the 
Agni. India possesses considerable force, but is it 
relevant force? Is there any weapon system that the 
country possesses today which can prevent a cruise 
assault?Ihe answer sadly is'noi Those entrusted with the 
responsibiliy for the defence of India have a poor 
strategic legacy. The lesson of the US attack on Iraq 
should serve as a reminder of the need to improve our 
strategic vision. 
, SOVIET UNION DISINTE-GRATION 
43. DEFENCE CONCERNS. Times of India. 154,214; 1991, Sepember 
7; 8; a. 
As the defence debate in the Lok Sabha brought out, 
there is widespread concern among members about the impact 
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of the momentous development in the Soviet Union on our 
armed forces because of our heavy dependence on hardware 
from this source. While the National SecurityCouncil set 
up by Mr. V.P. Singh was a misnomer-it amounted to nothing 
more than a defence committee of the cabinet-there is no 
gainsaying the need for an agency to do the staff work 
required to define available options taking an integrated 
view of military as well as non-military factors relevant 
to an overall security policy. 
44. TULLY (Mark). India and the development in the Soviet 
Union. Asian Affairs. 33,2; 1992, June; 142-51. 
The real point which I think will decide the future 
of India's defence policy and how it gets on with or 
without the Soviet Union, is what India does with its own 
defence product, particularly the main battle tank and 
the light combat aircraft. If it does not succeed with 
these-and the success of both is still in doubt-then 
unless at some stage, which we will all piously hope for, 
the whole situation in the Sub-continent changes, there 
would have to be massive defence purchases eventually to 
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make up for that. To sum up, I would say that events in 
the Soviet Union will make life harder for Indians. If 
they learn the lessons, however, I believe they could be 
part of a pattern of other eventswhich are forcing India 
to reconsider its whole position. 
, , SRI LANKA 
45. MEHTA (Ashok K). Might is right. Sunday. 22,2 1; 1995, May 
27; 82-3. 
While the internal and external threats are 
growing, the services are expected to muddle their way 
through. It is high time the armed forces' Chiefs were 
unequivocal in their denunciation of the systematic 
failures and resource deficiencies plaguing their 
organisations, which will interfere in execution of their 
task. The recent turn of events in Sri Lanka carries 
lessons for India: One you cannot switch off and switch on 
defence preparedness; and two, military power alone can 
create space for negotiations with adversaries. 
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, USA, LEGISLATION 
46. PRAKASAM (K P). Hank Brown spank. Nation and the World. 
3,99; 1995, November 16; 37-9. 
India's reaction to the Amendment had been rather 
sharp. It perceives the amendment as a pernicious move 
that would adversely affect India's security interests. It 
would also force India to upgrade its weaponry in order to 
maintain military parity. A US State Department, spokesman 
has asked India to "react responsibly". implying that 
India would treat the US decision to resume supply of arms 
to Pakistan as fact accompli and need not react as 
strongly as it did. The Brown amendment has come as the 
Clinton administration wanted it. 
—,effect on DEVELOPMENT, 1990s 
47. SREEDHAR. Defence and development: India's dilemma for the 
1990s. Strategic Analysis. 13,11; 1991, February, 1231-42. 
India's securiy concerns in the 1990s depend on its 
experience of the 1980s. The developments in the 1980s 
show three distinct trends. The use and threat of use of 
force to resolve bilateral disputes is slowly becomming 
irrelevant as demonstrated by the Iraq-Iran war. At the 
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same time, there were a number of low intensity conflicts 
like the company-level fighting between India and 
Pakistan. The resurgence of sub-nationalism and religious 
fundamentalism sufaced again in Punjab, Jammu and 
Kashmirposing new challenges to the security of India. 
Equally important are the developments in socialiste 
Europe and their likely impact on the Indian economy. In 
sum, along with the conventional threats to security, new 
forms of threats are getting added and posing new 
challenges to the Indian security environment. The new 
threats necessitate a reappraisal of defence preparedness 
on the part of India. 
DEYELOPMENT, role of DIPLOMACY 
48. MUKHERJEE (Pranab). Defence and development. NCOS 
Bulletin. 4,1993; 4-7. 
I am not anti-defence. All I am pleading for is a 
re-examination of some of our assumption that have 
governed defence planning in the country for so many 
years. Are there areas where through negotiation, through 
dialogue, through diplomacy we could contain the growth in 
our defence expenditure. In my view we should explore 
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every possibility in this regard. Our policies in the past 
have served as well. But they have served as well in a 
world that has ceased to exist. We cannot carry on 
business on the basis of the old world. There is also the 
larger developmental canvas in which defence has to 
operate. In my view, we can no longer view defence as an 
independent sector. We have to bring defence planning into 
the mainstream of national planning and tasks. 
49. PAWAR (Sharad). Defence and development. NCOS Bulletin. 4; 
1993; 1-3. 
Our national objective is to ensure a secure 
environment within which India can achieve unimpeded 
economic development. Based on this paramount objective 
and having regard to our financial position, force levels 
are determined and a strategy is worked out in which our 
foreign policy plays a significant part. At present, India 
is faced with an extensive defence and security perimeter. 
Although the defence forces play an important role in the 
development of the state (in tandem with their primary 
function of defence), there can be no substitude for the 
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improvement of relations between India and its neighbours. 
It is therefore, necessary to examine ways and means for 
reshaping the security environment, so that security can 
be achieved at lower levels of investments of national 
resource. 
, EQUIPMENT, SPARES, INDIGENOUS 
50. FLORY (Keith). EME prepares for spares challenge. 
Statesman. 130, 9458; 1991, October 14;8; a. 
When the Director General of the EME met reporters 
here to highlight the success gained in the Kvadrat 
project, it was inevitable that the media sought a "missile 
lock" to home in on the spares problem. And Lieutenant 
General K.K. Mehra seemed to welcome the opportunity to 
dispel the impression that the Army would be crippled for 
want of spares, even though the bulk of its heavy 
weaponry was of soviet origin. However, what today's 
problem of spares underscores emphatically is need for 
self-reliance. While in the context of defence, talk about 
self-reliance generally centres around high-profile 
ventures like developing indigenous missile. Systems a 
main battle tank, light combat aircraft and guided missile 
2 ^ -j^(9 -t, o^ .::; 
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destroyers, the attention to local production of spares 
and the upgrading of systems already in service has been 
inadequate. 
51. PRASANNAN (R). Armed forces are going for indigenous 
spares. Week. 14,23; 1996, August 4; 16-7. 
Defence Minister Mulayam Singh Yadav believes that 
indigenisation is the key to peace. "War will be thrust on 
us only if we are militarily or economically weak and 
continue to depend on others for our defence needs", says 
he, pointing to the security need for indigenisation. The 
ministry has made a ten-year plan to reduce foreign 
dependence to 30 per cent by the year 2005, The plan was 
sanctioned in August 1994 as a national mission. The 
effort is three pronged: (i) sustaining existing systems 
through indigenisation of spares; (ii) upgrading and 
stretching the life and capability of viable existing 
systems; and (iii) inducting more of major indigenous 
systems. 
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, TESTING role of ANTARCTICA 
52. ZAHOOR QASIM (S). India and the Antarctica. Indian Ocean 
News and Views. 1,1; 1991, January; 31-3. 
There are various benefits from the Antarctica 
research. The effect of prolonged exposure of severe cold 
and isolation in the Antarctica was studied on human 
psychology, health and human behaviours. The containerised 
accomodation in Antartica is developed by the Defence 
Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). As a result 
of the experience gained the container type of living 
accomodation has been improved considerably over the 
years. The experience gained in Antarctica has been 
successfully utilised in strategic areas for our defence 
needs. Rich experience has also been gained in the methods 
of erection and construction of buildings in extremely 
hostile weather conditions. Moreover, the design and 
development of special clothing, foodwear, tents and other 
accessories needed for the survival and stay in Antarctica 
are now being used in frontier areas by our defence force. 
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, FORMULATION 
53. HAZARI (K K). National interests: Formulation of national 
policy and strategic concepts. Indian Defence Review. 9,2; 
1994, April, 13-7. 
In the late 70s, the Armed Forces set about 
organising the Defence policy based on long-term goals. 
This was done through a series of Expert committees set up 
by individual service Headquarters. Regrettably this 
exercise was limited in scope. It dealt with individual 
service imperatives based on self-determined security 
objectives. Even as a Defence Policy it did not meet the 
bill. It was only in the mid-80s that the Government 
brought about certain reforms to attempt to bring the 
system. The Defence Planning Staff was instituted with the 
intention of placing an integrated Defence Budget before 
the Ministry of Defence (MOD). 
54. HOON (P N) . Who formulates defence policy? Hindustan 
Times. 67,313; 1990, November 12; 11; f. 
In the cabinet secretariat, there is today a 
Military Wing. This is headed by a Maj Gen (rotatory 
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appointment held by the three Services). The Director, 
Military Affairs reports directly to the cabinet 
secretary. This wing when constituted, was to provide the 
secretariat cover to the following:-
(a) Defence Committee of the Cabinet (then headed by the 
Prime Minister). 
(b) Defence Minister's Committee. 
(c) Chief of Staff Committee and a host of other 
committees in the Defence Ministry. 
, , CONTROVERSIES 
JASJIT SINGH. Affordable credible defence of India. 
Strategic Analysis. 16,11; 1994, February; 1379-1409. 
The issue related to defence decision making at the 
national level naturally raise the question of the system 
for the higher direction of defence. For many years'now the 
issue immediately gets linked to the question and debate 
on the need etc. or a national security council, or the 
establishment of a Chief of defence staff. These are 
important issues, and deserve serious deliberations and 
action. Meanwhile, it may be worth restoring the system 
and mechanism that wear established soon after 
82 
independence, but which fell into disuse since around 
1960. For example, the Defence Minister's Committee 
performed a key role in the early years. This in pra:'tice 
was replaced by the Defence Minister's morning meetings. 
Such meetings are very, useful for continuous exchange of 
views and even decision m^ing with regard to operational 
matters. 
^ ^ MANAGEMENT 
56. NAQVI (S S HUSSAIN). Integration of ministry of defence 
with service headquarters. Trishul. 8,2; 1996, Spring; 
21-26. 
There is a need for evolving a defence set up 
which is sensitive to changing strategic environment 
providing preparation time for the forces to be deployed 
and committed. Though our higher defence organisation has 
responded to the challenges in the past, it has not 
undergone any major changes from what we inherited from 
the British in the post independence era. Wars of today 
are total wars in which entire national efforts is 
involved. Therefore it is imperative that national 
security objectives are spelt out at the highest level so 
that a viable defence policy is evolved. At the Defence 
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Ministry and Service HQ' level there is a need for better 
co-ordination and integration so that-~ rplanning and 
execution of defence plans are more effective and 
economical. 
57. SETHI (M L). Higher defence organisation in India. Journal 
of the United Service Institution of India. 120,499; 1990, 
January-March; 21-7. 
The higher defence organisation of a country is 
concerned with the formulation of policy and management of 
its defence machinery to ensure attainment of national 
objectives. Defining these is the role of the political 
authority while their achievement is the task of the 
Defence Forces. Therefore, there is close relationship 
between the political leadernship and the defence forces 
in any country andits nature is determined by the system 
of Government. In a democratic set up the political 
machinery plays a dominant role so that the armed forces 
function according to the will of the people as symbolised 
by the Chief Executive of the Government. 
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58. VASUDEVA (P K). Change in the defence environment 
imminent. National Herald. 28, 48; 1995,April 24;5; a-c. 
There is a tussel between the Ministry of Defence 
(MOD) and the Service Headquarters for the last one decade 
regarding the working relations and the decision making 
between both these headquarters, which is not in the 
security interest of the country. The defence services 
want to have greater say in the key decision making and 
the bureauracy which is at the helm of the affairs feels 
that the status quo be maintained. There is a definite 
need to restructure MOD by reducing duplication at all 
levels. 
, , MINISTRY-SERVICE HEAD-QUARTERS, INTEGRATION 
59. DAVID (Ivan). Integration of ministry of defence with 
service headquarters. Journal of the United Service 
Institution of India. 126,524; 1996, April-June; 161-7. 
To understand the requirement of the need for 
integration of Service Head-quarters with the MOD we have 
examined at length the various departments in the MOD as 
also the financial advisors role. The duplication and 
triplication of examinations of issues lack of direct 
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access of military leadership to the political leadership, 
arbitration by the Defence Secretary on inter-service 
related matters and the non accountability by civil 
servants in the MOD for l^ses in the Defence Services are 
some of the undesirable issues. The present Higher 
Defence Organisation has worked over the last 48 years; 
however to make the system more efficient and responsive, 
it has been suggested that a Bill to reorganise the Higher 
Defence Organisation in India be enacted in Parliament. 
, , NATIONAL SECURITY role of OFFICERS 
60. CHIBBER (Aditya). National security doctrine: An Indian 
imperative- Seminar. 383; 1991, July; 49-50. 
In the absence of a national security policy, the 
vast and impressive Indian military establishment is prey 
to one adhoc directive after another from the government 
of the day. With no clear set of strategic ideas to 
animate them and no transparent parameters of action as 
guide-posts the armed forces are deprived of a raison 
d'etre which helps endow the military with purpose. A 
change in the thinking of the higher military command is 
necessary, but to now require the 'Agra Brigadier 
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inflexibly to month and live and die by the idiom is to 
once again intellectually cripple a new generation of 
field commanders who should rather be encouraged to break 
military dogma and to experiment. 
, ^ THEORY 
61. KASTURI (Bhashyam). c-^ 1 -its relevance in the Indian 
context. Indian Defence Review. 9,2; 1994, April; 66-9. 
The term C cubed 1 or c^l is an analgam of four 
systems and functions. Command, Control, Communications 
and Intelligence. The value of c^l lies iniits ability to 
provide a nation's executive with the wherewithal to make 
proper decisions affecting national security. It is also 
the means by which military opertions are carried out in a 
proper manner, leading to favourable situations to one 
side in combat. In a country like India, expensive C^l 
systems cannot be integrated. What needs to be done is to 
integrate indigenous C-^ 1 networks into our armed forces 
keeping in mind the need to upgrade C^l doctrines at the 
training level. That this process is already going on as 
is evident from the efforts at indigenous production and 
integration of "''^1 system, is a good sign for the future. 
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, FUNDS,BUDGET 
62. SINGH (V K) . Budgeting for defence : Arational approach. 
Indian Defence Review. 11,3; 1996, July-September; 34-7. 
Defence expenditure constitutes one of the major 
items of central Government expenditure and given the 
uncertain nature of the current world order and 
particularly of our own security environment will continue 
to do so for some time. A viable defence posture can only 
be attained and maintained by well planned deployment of 
financial resources in accordance with clearly defined 
long-term objectives. In this the procurement and 
upgradation of equipment has to be a continuous process 
and not be subject to ad hoc allocations leading to a 
'stop-go' syndrome. The paper there fore proposes that all 
budgeting for capital expenditure be based on duly 
approved five-year plans flowing from approved 
fifteen-year perspective plans. To ensure this thepaper 
propses a timebound programme for the formulation and 
approval of these plans. 
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63. VASUDEVA (P K). India's defence budget proposals not 
commensurate to global security environ. National Herald. 
28,35; 1996, April 10; 5; a-c. 
The strategic analysts have observed that the most 
important reform needed is to restore the colour service 
to seven years for soldiers ^ sailers and airmen and 
fifteen years for the officers upto the rank of a major. 
A system of their lateral transfer to civil occupations 
commensurate with their rank and qualifications will check 
further growth in pension bill and also enable the 
government to use their skills imported in the services 
and give all India orientation in their civil occupation. 
These decision can only be taken by National security 
Council (NSC) which is still a dream inspite of tall 
promises by the various Prime Ministers including the 
present one. 
, , , ANALYSIS 
64. KAUSHAL (Neeraj). India's defence budget; Can it be 
reduced? ACDIS Occasional Paper. 1995, June; 1-11. 
The level of defence expenditure is always 
justified on threat perceptions. In India's case the 
S3 
threat perception comes more loudly from Pakistan, but in 
real terms more from China. Confidence-building measures 
have been adopted between India and both of its 
neighbours. However, these are working more successfully 
with China than with Pakistan, and agreements such as no 
attack of each other's nuclear installations do not 
actually touch 'ipon the defence budgets. The military 
budgets a-^tually relate to conventional weapons, 
particularly high-tech and highly expensive weapons 
imported from external sources. This essay has argued that 
it is possible to save in most areas of conventional 
weapons. I would like to conclude by suggesting that the 
mutual reductions of defence budgets will in itself be an 
effective confidence-building measure, more so if the 
reductions are agreed upon by both sides, but unilateral 
reductions will also contribute to confidence building. 
/ / ,in relation to DEVELOPMENT, ECQNOMIGJand SOCIAL 
65. JEE (Sudhakar). Affordable defence within budget 
constraints. Trishul. 8,1; 1995, Antumn; 58-69. 
Disarmament and de-escalation being the order of 
the day, a relaxed and transparent security environment in 
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our region is the key to reduced tension and military 
buildup. The deep animosity and distrust have to be 
replaced by cordial relations and mutual trust by firm 
political will. A reactive policy must be replaced by 
shaping the environment policy. If the armed forces have 
to be in operational readiness within the continuing 
budgetory constraints, the need of the hour is an 
integrated approach in planning, reduction in the flab, a 
dynamic foreign policy marked by sincere confidence 
Building Measures, privatisation/closure of loss making 
production units, reduction on the colour service and 
harnessing the national infrastructural facilities during 
both peace and war. There is a need to identify the 
non-essential defence expenditure and substitute it with 
essential spending consistent with our long term security 
needs to facilitateharmonious blending of defence with 
economic and social development of the country. 
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, , , 1992-3 
66. SUBRAHMANYA (K). Defence expenditure in the budget. Link. 
34,32; 1992, March, 22;26. 
Finance Minister Manmohan Singh's second budget in 
less than 10 months increased the allocation for defence. 
The budget allocation under revenue and capital accounts 
for the three services increased by Rs. 1150 crore over the 
last year's allocation of Rs. 16350 crore. Next to the 
allocations for debt service the defence allocation 
represents the largest segment of the central Budget. 
Despite an increase of over a thousand crore rupees, the 
real allocation for defence has, indeed, declined. 
According to government estimates the rate of inflation 
during the last one year has exceeded 12 percent. This 
would mean that in order ever to keep up with the inflation 
trends the budget allocation for defence should have 
increased by at least around Rs. 1900 crore so as to 
maintain last year's allocation level. 
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, , , PROBLEMS 
67. MEHTA (Ashok K) . Money matters: The defence forces are 
starved of funds. Sunday. 22,18; 1995, May 6; 78-9. 
The ministry of defence's annual report for 
1994-95, replete with inanities, is neither a white paper 
nor a defence review. It reveals in profoundities like "it 
is essential that India maintains a sufficiently strong 
defence capability to safeguardits national interest". And 
"India is determined to do all it can to help ensure a 
secure environment in Asia, which will allow its economic 
development to proceed unimpeded". The 13 paise out of 
every rupee spent by the government out of the Budget 
estimate of Rs. 25,500 crore on defence, is roughly 10 
percent higher than the revised estimate of the previous 
year, though only a 15 percent increase in real terms can 
ensure a constant level of defence spending. Therefore, in 
money terms there has been a not reduction in defence 
allocation for the current fiscal year. 
68, PENDSE (K S) . India's defence budget: A case for better 
planning. Indian Defence Review Digest. 1;1992; 54-68. 
Having ranged over various ramifications of the 
defence budget, including what it does not do for the armed 
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forces of India it can be said that no conclusion 
ispossible without a national debate on India's security 
needs, and how to satisfy these through diplomatic, 
economic and military means. Starving the defence forces of 
funds for their critical infrastructure as well as current 
readiness levels by a normative aproach to budgeting for 
defence in a scenario of nuclear threat from within the 
region is not the way to ensure India's long-term security. 
, , CRISIS 
69. GUPTA (Shekhar).Middle-aged military machine. India Today. 
18,8; 1993, April 30; 38-45. 
It is time to rushcor the crisis stations in South 
Block. No new war has broken out nor a new insurgency. But 
India's strategic planners and defence forces top brass are 
finally waking up to a stark, bitter and scary reality; 
starving under the impact of five years of resource cuts, 
reeling from the utter disruption of supplies from the 
former Soviet Union and haemorrhaging from the relentless 
involvement in domestic fire fighting, the Indian military 
machine is losing its decisive edge against Pakistan. 
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, , EXPENDITURE 
70. KAUSHIK (Brij Norman). Optimal defence for India. Strategic 
Analysis. 13,4; 1990, July; 357-66. 
India must decide for itself its defence 
requirements, try to put a lid on its defence expenditure 
and review the threats to its security. Additional 
expenditure on defence will not be beneficial from the 
point of view of its economic development. A better 
management of the various issues of defence is required. 
Perhaps the future National Securiy Council will do it. 
Better diplomacy can also to a certain extent save India 
from expanding on defence. 
^ ^ ^ ARUN SIGH COMMITTEE 
71. JASJIT SINGH. Agenda for defence: Challenge of a 
multi-polar world. Times of India. 154-114, 1991, May 14;8; 
b-c. 
The most immediate task for the new government 
will be to recouncile the conflicting needs of military 
modernisation and containing the costs of defence. The 
report of the committee on defence expenditure headed by 
Mr. Arun Singh could formthe starting point. In the coming 
years low-intensity conflict threats to our security 
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arising out of complex factors, aggravated and exacerbated 
through external linkages is likely to pose a major 
challenge. The complexities of the challenges and 
opportunities necessitate a broad national consensus on 
national security and foreign policy issues. Without such a 
consensus, we will continue operating at a sub-optimal 
level, with serious risks to our vital national interests. 
72. MALHOTRA (Inder). Arun Singh panel's real task. Times of 
India. 153, 176; 1990, June 28;6; c-d. 
In keeping with his style, Mr.Arun Singh, as 
Chairman of the Committee on defence expenditure, is 
maintaining a low profile. He is back in the room in the 
defence ministry that he used to occupy as minister of 
state. The Arun Singh Committee will have to look at the 
nuclear dimension of national defence.Not to do so would 
be abdication of responsibility. There is a view, 
forcefully articulated by Mr. K. Subrahmanyam, that behind 
a credible nuclear shield this country can afford to slow 
down the modernisation of conventional weaponry and thus 
keep defence expenditure within reasonablelimits. This is. 
3{j 
of course, contested. An authoritative verdict by the high 
powered pond is called for. 
73. VED (Mahendra). Defence privatisation stressed. Hindustan 
Times. 68, 251; 1991, September 9;9; f. 
The need to encourage indigenisation and to make 
it cost-effective, has been stressed by the Arun Singh 
Committee on Defence Expenditure, which has said that 
indigenisation and cost effectiveness" are not mutually 
exclusive." The two can be achieved through proper planning 
and management. The Committee has noted that from a 
negligible foreign component at the time of Independence, 
the present level has come to nearly a fourth of the total 
defence outlay. Even this one-to-fourth ratio would be a 
misnomer since nearly half of the defence outlay is for 
salaries, pensions and establishment costs. This means a 
half of the expenditure on acquisition is in foreign 
exchange, a phenomenon that needs checking, the Committee 
has said. 
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, , COST ACCOUNTING 
74. GURUSWAMY (Mohan). Why cut on defence. Hindustan Times. 
67,15; 1990, January 15; 13; b-c. 
Important as national security is, the defence 
establishment can not be allowed to indulge in wanton 
expenditures as has been wont in the recent past. The Air 
Force can ensure substantial economies by seriously 
examining the possibility of retor-fitting the MiG-21s 
instead of phasing than out. The Indian Army can also 
similarly examine if the 155 mm Howitzer induction can be 
frozen at current levels and if the 130 mm field guns, for 
which extended range ammunition is now available can do the 
job that the licensed produced Bofors FH-77B is to perform 
there are other big ticket items such as the plan for yet 
another aircraft carrier that cry for re-examination. But 
as long as the armed forces insist on shrouding everything 
they want to spend money on in the cloak of national 
security, the doubts that come to be frequently expressed 
about their utility are valid. 
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75. HAZARI (K K). Resource crunch and defence management: 
Sustaining and modernising the army in keeping with 
security Commitments. Indian Defence Review. 7,1; 1992, 
January; 46-53 . 
As things stand, the two principal areas that 
absorb the bulk of defence costs are manpower and fighting 
platforms and systems. Indications are that defence 
expenditure would progressively go up rather than go down 
unless suitable steps are taken to prune the size of the 
existing defence establishment, and equipment development 
and production policies are revamped to bring down. The 
cost of induction of new equipment. These important issues 
must receive the urgent attention of policy makers and 
military planners so that a totality of measures can be 
evolved to contain defence costs without prejudice to the 
essential security needs of the country. 
-effect of REDUCTION 
76. SUBRAHMANYAM (K). How not to cut defence spending-I. 
Hindustan Times. 67»18; 1990, January 18; 11; b-d. 
Experience both in our country and elsewhere in 
the world has shown adhoc cuts in defence expenditure 
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affect preparedness and cause disruption in much higher 
proportion than the cut itself. Consequently it is time to 
have a close scrutiny of our defence spending and find ways 
and means of first containing its growth and levelling it 
off before attempting to reduce it gradually in terms of 
percentage of GNP. There are two aspects of defence 
expenditure that need to be examined. First, how much 
defence expenditure is enough to ensure reasonable security 
and, secondly, how do we get the maximum value for the 
expenditure incurred. It is obvious the two issues are 
interlinked. The efficient we are in management we can get 
the same level of security at a lower cost. 
, , , in relation to CHINA and PAKISTAN 
77. BHASKAR (Uday c). Matter of defence: No cuts in funding 
advisable. Statesman. 130, 9407; 1991, August 15;6; d-f. 
Given the priori position that we have a foreign 
policy led security environment situation, India has to 
take into account the history of its relations with its 
neighbours since 1947 and the external imperatives, be it 
the cold war or otherwise that have vitiated the security 
perimeter for India. Thus the military aid received by 
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Pakistan, or the Chinese Defence Minister's resolve to 
"update national defence as well as to develop modern 
weapons and equipment in a planned way, and to constantly 
improve the combat effectiveness of the PLA in modern 
warefare" cannot be ignored. Improving or enhancing the 
cost-effectiveness of defence spending will call for a 
major national security policy re-evaluation that 
encompasses strategic diplomatic, military , nuclear, 
technological, trade and environmental options among 
others, and that is what modern security is becomming 
increasingly concerned with. 
, , , PAKISTAN 
78. DEFENCE EXPENDITURE: Fact and fancy. Economic and 
PoliticalWeekly. 29,12; 1994, March 19; 662-3. 
Various short term (Pakistan's bellingerence or 
Kashmir and nuclear weapons) and long-term (China's 
military capability and primary strategic challenge) 
sources of threat are being cited to show how our 
combat-effectiveness has been diluted for want of a 
structured and well-articulated defence policy and also 
because of substantial defence expenditure cuts. 
1 0 1 
It is being argued that the defence budget, working out to 
2.44 per cent of GDP and 14.5 percent of central government 
expenditure, is ridiculously low as compared with 
Pakistan's defence budget at 7.1 percent of GDP and 37.5 
percent of its central government exlpenditure. It all 
defence related expenditure is properly accounted for, 
including that on the proliferating paramilitary forces, it 
is found that India's defence expenditure is neither as 
modest nor has the annual rise in it, even in real terms 
after allowing for inflation, been as demure as 
propagandists on behalf of the government would have us 
believe. 
, ,___, 1984-9 
79. SREEDHAR. Defence expenditure during the Rajiv Gandhi years 
(1984-1989). Strategic Analysis. 13,3; 1990, June; 219-32. 
In India, the Rajiv Gandhi years witnesseda sharp 
increase in defence expenditure with the implementation of 
the pay Commissions recommendations and with the initiation 
of major weapon acquisition programs as part of the armed 
forces' inventory modernization process. There were also 
four major war-like situations/localized wars during which 
10: 
Indian armed forces were asked to go the rescue of India's 
immediate neighbours. It is difficult to quantify the 
benefits that the Indian Republic has accrued by this 
investment in defence. Nevertheless, a peaceful and secured 
environment has been assured to undertake developmental 
work. 
, , , 1990s 
80. KHANNA (D D) and KUMAR (K). More affordable defence in the 
nineties. Indian Journal of Strategic Studies. 17;1992; 
19-30. 
The armed forces have to be in operational 
readiness, but that does not necessarily mean that it has 
to be an expensive defence force in order to be effective. 
It affordability requires an integrated approach in which 
both defence and civilian sector work in tandem. Measures 
have to be taken alongwith other fire-fighting methods to 
revive the entire economy, as defence has to function as a 
part of the economy. On the politico-strategic plane, more 
reliance on diplomatic efforts and a less confrontationist 
strategy would permit smaller arsenal and lesser 
deployment. India can take a number of confidence buildinq 
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measures without endangering its defence. Some structural 
changes in planning, procurements and R & D , will lead to 
the development of a more compact and functional defence 
force. In subsequent years, the forces would themselves 
makes lesser demand on resources due to better management. 
, , , PROPOSALS 
81. BHONSLE S M (Rahul K). Value added defence. Journal of the 
United Service Institute of India. 123,511; 1993, 
January-March; 51-65. 
The esoferic, pedestal on which issues related to 
defence are perched today needs to be firmy dismantled to 
universalise knowledge of matters military without qualms 
of spilling national secrets. While the cutting edge of the 
Armed Forces has to be retained, we can ill afford to 
achieve it at a high cost. Political will, a holistic 
approach, waste elimination and efficient management thus 
assume considerable significance. These reforms have to be 
undertaken at the earliest to avoid the pitfall of economic 
ruin through extravagance and unplanned, defence 
expenditure leading to greater social turbulence at home 
and in turn increasing the valnerabilities to external 
10^1 
aggression. The horse thus needs to be firmly put before 
the cart. 
82. SAWHNEY (Pravin). Curtailing expenditure. Seminar. 383; 
1991, July; 38-41. 
The Western media portrays India as a regional 
military power in the sub-continent with a progressively 
increasing capability for power projection. This is 
because, amongst the third world countries, India is the 
largest buyer of arms. It is, therefore, necessary that for 
an optimum use of the funds available to the defence 
services, there should exist a body to integrated the 
activities of the three services and decide both inter and 
intra-service priorities. Hence, there is urgent need for a 
Chief of Defence Staff and a National Security Council. 
83. SUBRAHMANYAM (K). How not to cut defence spending-II. 
HindustanTimes. 67,19; 1990, January 19;11; f. 
Over the longer term three areas need to be 
attended to. First as we modernize and step up the fire 
power of our armed forces and their mobility we should try 
to make our forces leaner by reducing the manpower to 
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machine ratio. There is significant scope for reduction in 
manpower and increasing efficiency. Secondly total 
integration of defence and developmental/planning will lead 
to economics of scale in regard to production of high-tech 
materials and equipment and also may lead to obtaining some 
returns on defence outlays. Thirdly once we are confident 
of our deterrent capability as seen by others we can 
intensify our diplomatic efforts for confidence building 
measures with China and Pakistan in conditions of 
stabilised deterrence in their and the rest of the world's 
perceptions. 
^ , UTILISATION, PROBLEMS 
84. DEFENCE LAPSES. (Editorial). Hindustan Times. 68,248; 1991, 
September 6,-11; a-c. 
The Defence Ministry which came under close 
scrutiny of the Comptroller and Auditor General as to the 
manner of its lax functioning and the expenditure it 
entailed under various heads has a lot to answer for 
considering the various lapses it committed during the year 
1989-90. There are many other cases involving delays, 
negligence, lack of vigil and plain incompetence which 
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cumulatively put our defence projects injeopardy,causing 
huge losses to the exchequer. A provision of Rs. 14,963.99 
crore was made for the defence services in 1989-90. But the 
actual expenditure was Rs. 14,889.31 crore. The 
supplementary grant of R. 50 crore obtained for the air 
force proved inadequate to the extent of Rs. 15.24 crore. 
The supplementary grant of Rs. 104.49 crore obtained for 
the ordnance factories could not be utilised to the extent 
of Rs. 39.25 crore. All told, there was under utilisation 
of Rs. 74.68 crore in the defence budget. 
, FUTURE 
85. MATHUR (Girish). India and democratic world. Link. 34,7; 
1991, September 29; 10-11. 
India has enhanced its ability to protect its 
territory, including the Andaman-Nicobr island chain, oil 
fields of its western coast, the sea-lanes of 
communication, and exploitable seabed resources. India may 
not yet be able to challenge the Chinese on the Himalayas 
or push Pakistan out of occupied Kashmir, but it can get the 
upper hand in ground warfare, if there is no risk of a 
nuclear confrontation. India has acquired enhanced 
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capability to deter foreign intervention, specially in 
South Asia, but theoretically in states within reach of its 
expanded air and sea lift capability. India needs external 
assistance to design its weapons which it has not 
obtained- But India must be counted among the nuclear 
overhand states with a capability, which could one day 
surpass that of China. 
86. MEHTA (Ashok K). On the fringe of politics. Sunday. 23,25; 
1996, June 23-29; 52-3. 
On external security, the commitments are 
specific: establish an NSC, reevaluate the country's 
nuclear policy and retain option to induct nuclear weapons 
refuse to accept CTBT, FMCR, MTCR under existing 
discriminatory regimes, expedite service production of 
Prithvi and press ahead with Agni I and II and other 
service-related projects. Soldiers long for clear-cut 
tasks, resonable resources andminimum interference. They 
prefer commitments to promises and most of all wish to be 
counted in the process of nation building. 
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role of DIPLOMACY 
87. NUGENT (Vicholas). Defence preparedness of India: Arming 
for tomorrow. Military Technology. 15,3; 1991, March;27-36. 
Successive Indian Governments have been committed 
tolmaintaining a strong India whilst at the same time 
endorsing the broad objective of disarmament and esponsing 
the philosophy of international peaceful co-existence. The 
teachings of Mahatma Gandhi, the guru of non-violence, have 
given way to a more pragmatic philosophy. The nation that 
first adopted civil disobedience as its means to win 
independence, rather than the offensive tactics adopted by 
other nations emerging from colonial rule, subsequently 
considered a course of military preparedness, and even 
nuclear readiness, as more apposite for the role it has 
taken upon itself to fulfil in the region and the world. 
Hence India's armed forces are the fourth largest in the 
world after the united states^ Soviet Union and China, 
though its gross national product is similar to that of a 
smaller European power, like spain. 
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, in relation to BANGLADESH and PAKISTAN 
88. BAJPAI (Kanti). South Asia after the cold war: Between 
integration and detente. Journal of Peace, Security and 
Development. 1;1995; 33-46. 
India, the small states and Bangladesh will come 
to form a zone of greater integration. India and Pakistan, 
by contrast will remain in an uneasy zone between cold war 
and low-level detente. They are the only two states who 
could go to war, yet it is unlikely that they will fight. 
While they will not fight, their relationship will remain 
fraught. If democracy survives and grows more mature in 
Pakistan, if Indian democracy advances rather than retreats 
over the next decade and if liberalisation spreads its 
benefits quickly and equitably, then the two core powers 
will have stronger states and stronger societies. These 
stronger states and stronger societies will be better 
equipped to stabilise relations and forge a broader peace. 
89. STRATEGY OF India's defence. (Editorial). Defence Seminar. 
5, 2-3; 1996, April; 7-8. 
Our strategy for Defence has too much of political 
overtones, and does not have adequate military or 
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professional thinking. More than anything, we believe that 
military thinking has to be subervient to political 
thinking and always toe its line. Hence we have not been 
able to sortout the problems in relation to Pakistan or 
Bangaladesh. There is need of good knowledge of basics of 
strategy for defence in our country, for which the retired, 
and even the serving officers need to contribute their 
thoughts. Until then we have to depend upon nature's 
kindness or greater lack or professional skills by the 
adversaries. 
, , BORDERS,CHINA 
90. MEHTA (Ashok K). Border-line case. Sunday. 22,40;1995, 
October 7; 78-9. 
The Indian Army hopes that our negotiators have 
extracted maximum concessions from the Chinese for 
wishdrawing from wangdung. But the irony is that 40 years 
on Indians have been unable to get the Chinese to agree to 
give their perception of the border, even after gobbling up 
Aksai Chine. Atma Ram an old soldier who witnessed the 
army retreat in 1962, is now employed in an army club in 
Calcutta. Tn the late fifties, he served briefly in the 
I l l 
Indian embassy in Beiging. He often wonders why the country 
is defensive and timid in dealing with the Chinese. His 
wrinkled face lights up at the name of wangdung. "Shabash" 
he tells his younger colleagues from 12 Assam, "You chaps 
did a great job", Atma Ram's advice on China is pethy. "Do 
not lower your guard. You can never trust the Chinese." 
91 . MISHRA (Rekha). Sino-Indian border agreement. Competition 
Refresher. 11,11; 1993, November; 97-8. 
The Government of the Republic of India and the 
Government of the People's Republic of China, have entered 
into the present agreement in accordance with the five 
principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, 
non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality 
and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence and with a view 
to maintaining peace and tranquillity in areas along the 
Line of Actual Control in the India-China border areas. 
This agreement marks a water shed in the mutual relations 
between the two countries. 
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^ ^ CHINA and PAKISTAN 
92. DASGUPTA (Sunil). A call to arms. India Today. 20,18; 1995, 
September 30; 92-7. 
India has always catered for a dual threat. 
Against China, India has aimed at defensive capability. But 
against Pakistan, India has maintained a vastly superior 
force. The objective has been to deter a repeat of the 48 
and 65 Pakistani intrusions into Kashmir, with a threat of 
massive retaliation across the Rajasthan plains. Now, 
however, the Indian side sees its conventional military 
superiority vastly eroded-since 1989 India has not 
purchased any major weapon system and force levels and 
readiness are down. Pakistan's strategy, on the other hand, 
has been to increase India's cost of retaliation. 
93. THOMSON (John Adam). India towards the year 2000. Asian 
Affairs. 21,2; 1990, June; 162-73. 
If there is one field more than another in which 
governments have a rasponsibility it is in foreign affairs. 
The latter are worth a mention here if only to debunk the 
notion that India faces enormous threats China could 
theoretically became a dangerous neighbour but the border 
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dispute, though extensive, is essentially unimportant to 
both countries. If their relations are otherwise tolerable 
as seems likely, the continuance of the border dispute can 
be tolerated. The Indian Army will not again be caught 
short by the Chinese and the latter are unlikely to try. 
The situation with Pakistan is more tense because its 
closer to home. In general, India is so much the strongest 
country in the sub-continent that she can safely promote 
good relations with all her neighbours with consequent 
implications for modest savings in the defence budget. 
, NEIGHBOURING STATES 
94. DIXIT (J N) . Year in the doldrums. Outlook. 2,1; 1996, 
January 3; 28-9. 
The last months of 1994 and early 1995 saw us in a 
bind over a range of issues. Relations with Pakistan showed 
a rising curve of hostility. Bangladesh accentuated tension 
by deciding to internationalise the Ganga water issue. We 
continued to face the impact of the ethnic conflict in Sri 
Lanka. In Nepal, instability and domestic political strife 
led to a revival of phobias about India. The US and other 
advanced countries stepped up pressure on us to toe their 
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line on the content and speed of our liberalisation plans, 
on the new and discriminatory-regimes being initiated on 
transfer and development of high technology, and on nuclear 
non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. Internal 
turbulence and uncertain foreign policies of, among others, 
China and Russia, brought difficulties in our relations 
with them. 
95. THAPAN (Mohan). India's defence : Mid-1991, Army and 
Defence Quarterly Journal. 121, 2; 1991; 218-20. 
Three books have recently been published in India; 
about her defence problems, her Army and her relations with 
her island neighbour. Aditya chibber writes for the Indian 
politician, in the hope that the political mind will apply 
itself to the study of India's military history, geography, 
economy and demography so as to evolve a sound national 
security doctrine. Not without justification, the 
implication is that independent India has never had a 
coherent outlook on defence. The result was humiliation at 
the hands of the Chinese in 1962. Although India's military 
reputation was redeemed in the subsequent Indo-Pakistan 
wars of 1965 and 1971, a continuing review of threats. 
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force levels and the strategy required to meet them is 
imperative. 
, PAKISTAN 
96. DATTA (Rakesh). India's non-military options towards 
Pakistan. Indian Defence Review. 8,2; 1993, April; 82-3. 
The present Indian policy of wait and watch is 
becoming counter productive and has even put the country on 
the defensive vis-a-vis Pakistan. But learning from 
experience, India must buildup its defence posture to a 
position of strength. There is no harm in India developing 
a minimum deterrence response to Pakistan's quasi-nuclear 
threat. Because, even to effectively pursue non-violent 
strategies one must possess the capacity to be violent. 
This will checkmate most of Pakistan's initiatives against 
India, including military. 
, role of CHINA 
97. THREATS FROM across the border. Democratic World. 21,6; 
1992, March 31;9. 
The growing ties between China and Pakistan and 
the liberal way in which China was supplying sophisticated 
arms and nuclear technology to Pakistan have made the 
l i t ) 
Indian leaders take a fresh look on the defence and foreign 
policy strategies. It is true that the Government of 
india's policy towards Pakistan is hardening. President 
Venkataraman had also alerted the nation to keep vigil. 
During the last few days, the Defence Minister, Sharad 
Pawar, had visited most of the forward areas, pepping up the 
morale of the soldiers. He gave a clear warning that if 
Pakistan tried to create any trouble, India would give a 
fitting reply. 
, SOUTH ASIA 
98. THORNTON (Thomas P). Search for moorings in a new world 
order. Asian Survey. 32,12; 1992, December; 1063-77. 
India has also carried out a huge military buildup 
over the past decade and more. It has greatly modernized 
its forces, developed a nascent distant operations 
capability that it used in its intervention in the 
Maldives, and to all intents and purpose is an acknowledged 
nuclear power with the beginnings of a ballistic missile 
delivery capability. India is unarguably militarily supreme 
within South Asia and its strength is attracting the 
respectful attention of nations all around the rin of the 
Indian Ocean. Since these are all things that the indian 
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security and foreign policy establishment has long worked 
for, this should be a time of triumph in India. 
, INDIAN OCEAN 
99. DOCTOR (Adi H). India's Indian ocean policy. Indian Journal 
of Political Science. 51,3; 1990, July-September; 360-78. 
India has considerable interest in the declaration 
of the Indian Ocean region as a zone of peace, because for 
the states of the Indian Ocean region, peace is a must for 
the orderly development of their nascent economics. To 
conclude our Indian Ocean policy should be two fold. 
Firstly, we must develop our capability to patrol the 
adjoining areas as well as develop adequate surveillance 
and reconnaissance capability. Here we must work in concert 
with other littoral states sharing information about 
external activities in the region with them and alerting 
than the danger of foreign fleet movements troop 
deployments etc. In this regard the time has come for us to 
consider seriously the need to develop a naval base at the 
southern tip of the Nicobar Islands called the Indira 
Gandhi point. Secondly, we must not let our policy of 
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developing our own naval capability hinder our general 
approach to the Indian Ocean being declared a zone of 
peace. 
, , in relation to CHINA 
100. AKHTAR MAJEED. Sino- Indian waves in the Indian Ocean. 
Indian Ocean News and Views. 2,1; 1992, March; 15-6. 
No doubt, Indian Navy is a regional navy and there 
is no denying that this navy's preponderance, endurance and 
acquisitions have increased recently, though belatedly. 
Yet, these developments have not made it a Thalassocracy 
(Sovereign of the sea) and the Indian Navy has miles to 
sail before the continental power position of the country 
is transformed, obtaining extra-peninsular zones of naval 
influence. This has been presently aggravated by the cuts 
in the Defence Budget the steep rise in prices the non, 
supply of spares by Russia which affects nearly 70% of the 
Fleet, the ambiguity of the rouble-rupee conversion rate 
and the lack of adequate warship building capacity in the 
country. 
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, , NEIGHBOURING STATES 
101. DHARMARAJAN (H). India's role in the context of Indian Ocean 
security. Journal of the United Service Institution of 
India. 120, 499; 1990, January-March; 185-97. 
India's strategy to prevent encroachment on its 
security interest in the lOR is working out favourably. 
Playing an active role in this context, the recent 
developments have had a predominance of Indian 
participation. Welcoming the new democracy in Pakistan and 
progressing on further normalization talks, assisting the 
natural-calamity prone Bangladesh in the form of flood 
relief, brokering peace talks in Sri Lanka for the 
Government with the Tamil insurgents and rescuing the 
Maldivian Government from a blood thirsty coup, have all 
given a chance for India to provide greater stability in 
the lOR. With responses varying between accommodation and 
belligerency, depending on the circumstances, the fragile 
nature of the reapproachment with the Indian Ocean states 
is -novf a thing of the past. 
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, , NAVY,BUDGET 
102. ROY (Mihir K). Budgeting India's Oceanic security, Indian 
Ocean News and Views. 2,1; 1992, March; 17-8. 
The Indian Navy so far has been pegged to 12% 
(army 58% and Air Force 30%) of the Defence Budget which 
continues at 4% of the G.N.P. Naval Headquarters has 
nevertheless been charged with the security of a sea area 
of over 2 million square miles a coastline of 7000 kms on 
which there are vital installations such as Tarapore, 
Trombay, Kalpakkam, and Sriharikota. This responsibility 
also encompasses 1284 islands and islets, widely dispersed 
sea lanes of communication (SLOGS) and the safety high 
value off shore oil platform not to mention to spectrum of 
seaforce tasks which are mandatory during conflict such as 
blockade, surface, amphibious and submarine warfare. 
, , SECURITY 
103. NAYYAR (K K) . Indian security concerns. Indian Ocean News 
and Views. 3,1; 19 93, March; 5-6. 
The modest Indian armed forces today require 
modernisation and expansion to act as guarantors of peace in 
the India Ocean region. Historically, the region has been 
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stable only when India has been strong. It is, therefore, 
important that regional countries see the Indian armed 
forces development in the correct perspective and not be 
swayed by coy about accepting and enunciating her due role 
of being a preserver of peace in the region. 
, INTELLIGENCE 
L04. KASTURI (Bhashyam). Military intelligence in India: An 
analysis. Indian Defence Review. 9,1; 1994, January; 71-4. 
The present paper seeks to understand the 
importance of Military Intelligence to the security of any 
country. More specifically, it examines the role and 
organisation of Military Intelligence in India. The field 
of military Intelligency is in some ways a specialised one 
for it deals with the requirements of the Armed Forces of a 
country. 
, MARITIME SECURITY, NAVY 
105. CHATTOPADHYAY (Rupak). Indian maritime security: Case for a 
blue water fleet. Indian Defence Review. 9,3; 1994, July; 
79-83. 
Changing power equations in Asia dictate that 
India must upgrade her existing naval resources to defend 
her interests against possible encroachments by rivals. An 
12: ,) 
expanding economy such as India's needs to be backed by a 
powerful force of arms. The scramble to quench the economy's 
thirst for trade will no doubt lead to frictions with other 
similar economies in the region. If and when such an event were 
to occur, India must not find herself in a weak bargaining 
position. The only way to prevent this is by having at its 
disposal, a substantial blue water fleet that would make Indian 
interests known and defended along the shores of the Indian 
Ocean. 
06. DIXIT (Aabha). Indian navy: Working out of a financial and 
operational crisis? Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter. 23, 3-4; 
1996, March-April; 20-21. 
After growing rapidly through the 1980s, the Indian Navy 
prassed panic buttons with the Indian Government in the 1990s. 
Paucity of financial allocations and a severe hampering of its^ 
Operational efficiency with the snappingof links with the 
erstwhile Soviet Union have sharply affected the Navy's 
ability to project itself in the Indian Ocean, which 
according to Indian naval planners, has assumed greater 
importance, since the end of the Cold War. But the trough through 
which the Navy has been passing for more than five years 
has finally caught the attention of the Parliament, whose 
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standing Committee on Defence, in a report submitted in 
April 1995, has prioritised the demandsof the Indian Navy, 
which include replacement of ageing aircraft carriers, 
Foxtrot-class submarines, acquisition of new frigates, 
procurement of aircraft for maritime reconnassance and the 
quick completion of the Seaward Defence Boat Replacement 
Program. 
107. PRESTON (Antony). India's naval expansion. Asian Defence 
Journal. 1992, September; 66-72. 
The Indian Navy has from the start aimed at a wide 
range of capabilities, with the result that it has a degree 
of offensive power which is unusual among second-rank 
navies. This is the result of owning two aircraft carriers 
and an impressive number of submarines, as well as the full 
range of supporting escorts and auxiliaries. The Naval Air 
Arm has two aircraft carriers, the 30-year old Vikrant 
(laid down as HMS Hercules in 1943) and the 23- years old 
Viraat (ex-HMS Hermes) bought from the Royal Navy in 1986. 
The 19,500-ton Vikrant opertes six sea Harrier FRS. 1 short 
Take Off/Vertical Landing (STOVL) aircraft and nine MK 42 
sea King helicopters, whereas the 28,700 ton Viraat operates 
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12 sea Harriers and seven Sea Kings. Both ships have 
undergone progressive modernisation and upgarding over the 
years, including the addition of 12 and 9.75° Ski-jumps to 
increase the payload and rnge of the Sea Harriers, but the 
Vikrant is showing her age, and needs replacing as a matter 
of urgency. 
108. SUBRAHMANYAM (K). Naval security doctrine for India. 
Strategic Analyis. 12^11; 1990, February; 1135-46. 
We would require a limited crosswater capability 
for the defence of our island territories. That would, 
however, be very limited and that capability should not 
cause worry to any of our neighbours or the Indian Ocean 
littoral nations. Our acquisition of nuclear weapons, 
missiles, a powerful Air Force, a powerful mobile Army and 
even a powerful defensive Navy inclusive of 
nuclear-propelled submarines, medium sized aircraft 
carriers, missiles ships would not create as much concern 
among our neighbours as the acquisition of naval power with 
significant crosswater force projection capability. This 
factor we should bear in mind and our security doctrine 
should be developed on this basis. 
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—,— , , AIR CRAFT CARRIERS 
109. JASJIT SINGH. Securing sea power. Frontline. 12,21; 1995, 
October 20; 54-6. 
Essentially, the solution for adequate defence of 
warships and merchant fleet lies in area air defence 
capabilities and area anti-submarine warfare capabilities 
to meet traditional challenges and the new parameters 
imposed by theinduction and proliferation of antiship 
cruise missiles. This is achieved most cost-effectively by 
a platform at sea capable of undertaking these tasks. This 
is the reason also for the re-designation of Indian 
aircraft carrier pltforms for the future as Air Defence 
Ships" (ADS). In reality, two operational carriers will be 
required, one each for the Arbian Sea and the Bay of Ben^l 
To have two operationally available, a total of at least 
three carriers will be needed in the long-term perspective. 
110. MOOKERJEE (Subimal). Blue water blues. Frontline. 12,21; 
1995, October 20; 51-4. 
India has not only remained steadfast to the 
ideology of aircraft carriers but acquired, as recently as 
12G 
1987, a second aircraft carrier, condemned to the scrapyard 
by Britain. More important, pressure is being mounted on 
the Government to accept a twin-track policy to replace the 
aged aircraft carriers stricken with diminishing 
operational availability and worthiness. The fast- track 
approach is to replace INS Vikrant, India's first aircraft 
carrier, by the direct purchase of a second-hand carrier. 
The probable acquisition of the Russian aircraft carrier 
Goroshkov, purported to be on sale, is being discussed in 
theprint media.Goroshkov does not meet the Navy's 
operational requirements: There is serious mismatch with India's 
operating and maintenance infrastructure, and also 
theproblem of getting spares, encountered with all 
ex-Soviet ships. Still, its acquisition has been urged on 
the ground that no other second-hand carrier is available 
for sale. 
, ,--,AMPHIBIOUS 
111. BAKSHI (G D) . Future of emphibious operations: The Indian 
context. Trishul. 8,2; 1996, Spring; 79-90. 
In the long term perspective therefore, despite 
the recent Sino- Indian detente, we need to take serious 
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note of China's rapidly increasing naval capabilities and 
power above her corps sizedmarine amphibious assault 
capability. Her aggressive displays in the South china sea 
and the possibility of any spill over of conflict in that 
region to the Indian Ocean literal is not something we can 
ignore with equanimity. To what extent we need to upgrade 
and enhance our amphibious warfare capabilities and try to 
actualise the 'Over the Horizon Assault' concept. The pay 
offs would be enormous not just on the context of future 
Chinese capabilities or intensions but even more so in the 
context of any likely conflict with our Western Adversary. 
, , , COLLABORATION, CHINA 
112. CHAUDHURY (Rahul Roy). Indian naval displomacy. Indian 
Defence Review. 10,1; 1995, January-March; 53-6. 
Indian naval diplomacy is seen to be most 
effective in areas where mutual interests prevail and 
potential sources of conflict are minimal. In a more 
limited manner, it could help build relations with both 
Pakistan and China. The first visit by a Chinese naval ship 
to Bombay in recent times took place in 1992 A reciprocal 
Indian visit to a Chinese port is on the cards. Indian 
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naval diplomacy also needs greater coordination amongst the 
Ministry of External Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, and 
Naval Headquarters. The annual reports of the Ministry of 
External Affairs, for example.do not acknowledge good will 
visits by Indian naval ships to foreign ports, or even 
joint naval exercises. 
effect on PAKISTAN 
L13. CHEEMA (Pervaiz Iqbal). Indian naval buildup and South east 
Asian security: A Pakistani view. Contemporary South east 
Asia. 13,1; 1991, June; 86-102. 
India's naval buildup continues apace. Its 
maritime strategy envisages an inner zone covering the 
South Asian region in which it seeks complete 
acknowledgement of its states as the dominant power. The 
surrounding zone extends to Southeast Asia and Africa where 
India seeks to neutralize outside naval presence . having 
failed to dislodge such presence through non-aligned 
diplomatic pressures. 
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, ^ , EXPANSION 
L14. GOVIL (S P) . Indian navy: Its shape and size, Indian 
Defence Review. 9,2; 1994, April; 18-21. 
A time has come for the political leadership to 
evolve a mechanism which will stipulate realistic and firm 
force levels for the three Services avoiding adhoc 
decisions which sometimes get taken. The Navy's 15 year 
perspective plan has been with the Government for 
sometimes. This needs to be attended to at the appropriate 
decision making level at the earliest. In the foreseable 
future, therefore, the Navy that would meet India's 
national interests will have to have adequate forces to 
deploy in sea areas around us and in all weather 
conditions. Our shipyards and associated industries will 
have to be geared up to produce the ships/sub-marines and 
hardware that is needed. 
, , , HELICOPTERS 
115. INDIAN NAVAL helicopter goes on show. Jane's Defence 
Weekly. 25,8; 1996, February 21; 14. 
India's Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL) has flown 
the prototype of the naval version Advanced Light 
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Helicopter (ALH). This version is the fourth prototype of 
the helicopter. The first two aircraft were basic 
prototypes, The third was built to airforce/army 
specifications. The naval version is powered by two 1300 
shp LHTEC T800 engines and includes retractable gear 
decklock, pressure refuelling and foldable tail boom. 
Fairings on the fuselage sides house main wheels and 
flotation gear. The naval variant will be offered to 
replace the ageing Chetaks in service with the Indian Coast 
Guard and Navy. They will meet a possible ASW/anti-ship and 
troop transport dual role requirement. 
, , , IMPORTANCE 
116. SATYAVIR SINGH. Maritime power and national security. 
Indian Defence Review. 9,2; 199 4, April; 48-5 2. 
To develop an efficient defence apparatus (meansa 
combination of all the economic, technological and security 
elements) to protect the national interests,maritime power, 
is vital to national security. Hence to check or face the 
forseeable threats and challenges from the sea (bottom, 
surface and outer space), a nation must acquire missiles 
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submarines, aircraft carriers and satellite technology. In 
the final analysis, maritime power is vital to the economic 
growth, prosperity andnational security of the modern 
states. The pertinent point which is to be noted is that a 
nation must acquire the capability to utilise and exploit 
science and technology to the add to power and 
effectiveness of the traditional elements of maritime power, 
people and the Government must have a strong national will 
to develop its maritime power. 
in relation to SOUTHEAST ASIA. 
117. NAIDU (G V C). Indian navy and Southeast Asia. Contemporary 
Southeast Asia. 13,1; 1991, June; 72-85. 
The Indian navy grew slowly during the two decades 
following India's independence in 1947. The buildup began 
in the 1970s and the pace acceleraed in the 1980s, causing 
concerns among South and Southeast Asian states. Such 
concerns have more to do with the ambiguity and lack of 
clarity regarding India's security policy and strategic 
outlook than with the actual capabilities of the Indian 
navy. Confidence building measures seem necessary to 
assuage concerns in Southeast Asia over the growth of 
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India's naval presence in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands 
which are close to the mouth of the Straits of Malacca. 
,___, , 1990s 
118. CHAUDHURY (Rahul Roy). Indian navy in the 1990s. Indian 
Defence Review. 7,4;.192, October; 63-6. 
For a large peninsular country like India, one 
would have expected the Navy to pay an extremely important 
role in security policy formulation. The Navy's limited 
share of the defence budget is due largely to the dominance 
of the Army/Air Force in Indian Policy, and the perceived 
absence of a critical naval threat to Indian security. Navy 
can play only a secondary role in warfare against Pakistan 
and China. In the absence of Pakistan's dependence on 
maritime trade in the short term, the outcome of conflict 
would continue to be decided by the Army and Air Force. 
Also, the likelihood of an engagement between the Chinese 
and Indian navies in a conflict appears slim. A critical 
naval threat to Indian security, moreover, has not yet 
arisen. 
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19, SINGH (San^ay J). India's maritime strategy for the 90's. 
Journal of the United Service Institution of India. 120,49; 
1990, January-March; 349-51. 
Since the Indian mainland and island territories 
are spread over a large area, these zones of defence are 
also considerable in size. This factor, coupled to their 
being tiireatened in greater magnitude and at longer distance 
on account of advances in technology, requires India to 
build up a balanced sea power which can meet the 
requirements of defence in these various zones. Since the 
sea is the only medium where all the dimensions of war can 
be exploited, viz surface, subsurface, air and space, a 
balanced sea power would be one which can cater to 
multi-dimensional threats,and in our context these must be 
perceived in relation to our territorial integrity and 
off-shore asset as our maritime strategy is essentially 
defensive in nature. 
, , , PATROL BOATS 
20. SIDHU ( W P S ) . In choppy waters. India Today. 15,18; 1990, 
Septtember 30; 145. 
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For the Indian Navy, the loss of INS Andaman,one of 
its seven Soviet built Petya class patrol boats, on the 
evening of August 20, represents a major setback. For, with 
the sinking of the ship, 150 nautical miles off 
Visakhapatman, the navy not only suffered a weakening of 
its anti-submarine arm, it also lost its enviable 
reputation for optimally and innovatively using its 
equipment. The Audaman's loss may cost the navy an 
estimated Rs. 8 crore, including the initial cost of the 
ship and weapons on boards. But if the navy draws a lesson 
from this tragedy,then the sacrifice of INS Andaman and its 
crew won't have been entirely in vain. 
, , , SHIPS, MAINTENANCE 
21. DASGUPTA (Sunil). Navy: In troubled waters. India Today. 
19,8; 1994, April 30; 130- 31. 
The Indian Navy manned panic stations late last 
year. The engine room of its flagship aircraft carrier, INS 
Viraat, had been flooded while mechanics were changing a 
seal in a pump without closing the safety valves. Within 
two hours the room was waist-deep in water. Senior 
officials rushed to the.spot, the waterwas pumped out, and 
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fortunately there was no major damage. The incident 
highlighted an unpleasant reality; that mounting 
maintenance problems and related factors have seriously 
undermined the operational status of the Indian Navy. And 
at a time when Indo-Pakistan relations are under tremendous 
strain and China is eyeing a base in the Indian Ocean, this 
is worrying defence planners. The flooding, along with the 
sinking of the Petya-class frigate, INS Andaman, off the 
eastern coast in 1990, are both indicates that the 
problems are serious. 
, SUBMARINE 
122. SUBRAMANIAN (T S). Saluting a pioneer: Navy bids farewell 
to its first submarine. Frontline. 13,14;1996, July 15-26; 
66-72. 
At the function to decommission the Kalavari, Vice-
Admiral P.S. Das declared that the history of the Indian 
Navy was marked by moments of great pride and emotion. He 
recalled the arrival in the Bombay harbour of the first 
aircraft carrier INS Vikrant, the sinking of the Pakistani 
submarine Ghazi, the building of the indigenous frigate 
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Nilgiri and, above all, the arrival of Kalvari in the 
Indian waters. "Today we feel a certain amount of sadness 
but we are also looking ahead", he said. "This Kalvari 
will be replaced by another Kalvari, and we can face the 
future with pride and confidence." 
, ,PARA-MILITARY, COAST GUARD 
123. SATYAVIR SINGH. India's coast guard and India's maritime 
security. National Cognress for Defence Studies Bulletin. 
4;1993; 29-37. 
Keeping in view India's politico-economic and 
strategicinterests in the Indian Ocean region, the 
maritime security policy of India at present is based on 
three important elements i.e. establishment of Indian 
Ocean as a zone of peace by deinduction of the military 
presence of Great Powers through international and regional 
co-operation, strengthening of india's maritime forces to 
withstand and intra-regional or extra regional challenge and 
to safeguard India's legitimate national interests and the 
interests of friendly states in the region from the 
external maritime threats. The concept of maritime defence 
and strategy become more wide and complex due to Great 
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Powers sea-based deterrence strategies, satellite 
technologies with observation capabilities, coercive 
diplomacy and recent maritime gains throw law of the sea. 
The quota of direct recruitment 'n the Indian coast Guard 
should be increased so that its dependence on the other 
services particularly the Navy will be decreased. 
, MISSILE 
124. PANWAR (Sango). Shape of India's emerging missile shield. 
Strategic Analysis. 13,3;1990, June; 315-26. 
India faces to the north and north-west countries 
with whomit has fought four wars. It finds constant 
increase in its force levels a proposition which will 
bring proportionately less accretion in security in 
relation to increment in capacity. It has found a new 
panacea to assuage its defence dilemmas in the 1990s and 
beyond by investing in development of high tech weaponry 
of which the integrated Guided Missile Development 
Programme (GMDP) launched in 1983 is the lynchpin. 
125. PRAKASAM (K P). Of M-11, P-3C and all that. Nation and the 
world. 3,94; 1995, September 1; 38-9. 
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with the induction of the Indian Prithvi missile and 
further development of Agni missile, India can ably meet 
any defence situation posed by a missile p.ttack 
from any neighbouring country, let alone Pakistan. Indian 
defence policy planners need not panic and fall into the 
business promotion tactics of multinational arms 
manufacturers and create a charged climate congenial for 
buying from Lockhead a slightly improved version which 
they are marketing soon. 
126. PRITHVI AND Agni. (Editorial). Hindu. 119, 145; 1996. June 
18, 10; b-c. 
A critical task before the defence research 
establishment is to ensure that the work done so far on 
the indigenous development of Prithvi, Agni and other 
missiles is completed for their eventual induction into 
the armed forces. The user trials of the Prithvi which is 
a tactical 150-250 km mobile battle field missile carried 
out by the Army have already been completed and all that 
now remains is the launching of serial production for 
deployment. A special artillery regime has already been 
established for this purpose. The indigenous content of 
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the missile is higher than 90 per cent. The Army's 
requireimnt is for the shorter 150 km range Prithvis while 
the Air Force would need the longer range 250 km vergion. 
127. SKY IS the limit. (Editorial). Hindustan Times. 67, 227; 
1990, August 17; 11; a-c. 
With the successful test firing of themulti-target 
surface-to-air missile (SAM), Akash, on Tueseday, India 
has achieved the remarkable feat of having developed five 
missiles in a row- the others being, Agni, Trishul, 
Prithvi and Nag-within a seven-year period. Thus 
achievement places us among the top few countries in the 
missile field. 
128. SUBRAHMANYAM (K). Indian enters missile age. Times of 
India. 153,191; 1990, July 13;6; c-e. 
The country was justifiably proud when the Agni 
missile was launched last May and is looking forward to 
the second Agni testlater this year which will incorporate 
further technological advancements. Agni is the product of 
the integrated missileprogramme of the Defence Research 
and Development Organisation (DRDO) and is one of a family 
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of five missiles- Agni, Prithvi, Akash, Trishul and Nag. 
All of these except Akash have been tested successfully 
and were developed within a short period of six years. Our 
scientists have proved abroad that, in both their 
innovative talents and organising capability, they are 
second to none. 
, and LIGHT COMBAT AIRCRAFT 
129. INDIA BECOMES world's sixth missile power. New Age. 44,2; 
1996, January 20;6; a-c. 
1995 will stand out as the year of strides in 
uplifting India's indigenous hi-tech defence capability. 
With the productionisation of Prithvi misiles and advances 
in Agni, Trishul, Akash and Nag, India could stake claim of 
being the world's sixth missile power. 1995 was a year of 
remarkable achievement for DRDO- the most significant and 
the recent one being the roll out of light combat aircraft 
(LCA). The world's smallest, light weight, multi-role 
aircraft is poised to make its mark as a potent frontline 
weapon system at the turn of the century. 
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, , ANTI-TANK (ATM) 
130. ANOTHER MISSILE. (Editorial). Hindustan Times. 67,332; 
1990, December 1; 11; a-b. 
To the formidable array of four fully tested 
indigenous missiles Agni,Prithvi, Akash, Trishul-developed 
by the defence Research and Development Organisation 
(DRDO) in a short span of six years can now be added the 
fifth. Nag, the third-generation anti-tank missile. It was 
successful tested in Orissa on Thursday. India can now 
proudly claim to have a family system. The introduction of 
the Missile Technoogy Control Regime (MTCR) by seven 
industrialised nations (US, Canada, Japan, UK, France, 
West Germany and Italy) in 1983 was meant precisely to 
deny the advanced technology to developing nations 
including India. It goes to the credit of our men that 
India has developed indigenously all that was denied to it 
under MTCR. The missile has a range of four kilometres and 
uses a solid propellant motor; it is also equipped with 
day and night vision devices. 
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, , DEVELOPMENT 
131. GERARDI (Greg J). India's 333rd Prithvi Missile Group. 
Jane's Intelligence Review. 7,8; 1995, August; 361-64. 
Toward the end of the Prithvi's fight-testing cycle 
in 1992, reports began to appear in the Indian press 
alluding to the coming 'induction' and 'deployment of the 
missile system. The exact meaning of these words has only 
recently become apparent. In what seems to be an attempt 
to have one's cake and eat it, India is introducing the 
Prithvi missile into its reserve forces and stationing it 
away from the border area. In this way, India's leaders 
can avoid international pressure by maintaining that they 
have not deployed the Prithvi system. On 20 September 
1994, General Ramesh Khosla stated 'we are in the final 
stages of user trials and the missile system should be 
ready for induction very soon. We are working on 
establishing a complete service and maintenance 
infrastructure before these missiles are eventually 
introduced into the army'. Yet while it appears that the 
Prithvi is currently being introduced into service, it is 
unclear how many missiles will actually be fielded. The 
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Indian junior defence minister, M.Malik Arjun, has stated 
that although the Prithvi missile has successfully 
achieved its objective and user trials are complete, we 
have yet to take a decision on serial production'. 
, , EXPORT 
132. VORA (Batuk). India's missile plan under scrutiny. Times 
of India. 156, 160; 1993, July 7; e-f. 
Both Japanese and American watchdogs are joining 
hands to try and prevent any high technology export that 
could be used by others for manufacturing weapons. 
The joint effort is now centred on missile manufacturing 
in India, China and Pakistan. It has been admitted in the 
chapter on India that, "India does not yet export missile, 
nor has it ever been a major exporter of defence 
equipment. The Indian government is in a position to sell 
complete systems, other weapons technologies now 
licence-produced by Indian private industry. Unintended 
'leakage of privately produced dual-use technologies 
through the Indian export control system is a further 
concern. 
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, , IMPLICATIONS 
133. MAN MOHAN. Deadly missiles in India's arsenal. Hindustan 
Times. 68,49; 1991, February 18; 10; b-d-. 
India today stands among the exclusive groups of a 
few nations which, make their own sophisticated 
state-of-the-art missiles. In fact, India now possesses 
the capability of firing its own intermediate range 
ballistic missiles. In the present international security 
scenario, missiles have become an integral part of the 
defence strategy, to be used against the enemy before 
starting ground hostilities. In the opinion of the chief 
architect of India's Integrated Guided Missile Programme, 
Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, "Our missiles, when fully 
developed, will be on par with the ones in 
the arsenels of the super powers." However indigenous 
missile programme will certainly increase Indian armed 
forces' firepower and capability to hit precise targets. 
-in relation to CHINA 
134. SUBRAMANIAN (R R) . Missile needs of the nineties. 
Hindustan Times. 67,84; 1990 March 27; 11; f. 
India enters the 21st century with a missile 
profile in theory at least. Within a gap of a year the 
DRDO test fired two missiles one the 250 km range Pritivi 
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and the other the 1,000 km range 'Agni' intermediate range 
ballistic missile (IRBM). Whilst Agni would be relevant 
for China Prithvi would meet Pakistan's threat on the 
battlefield. India has to ensure that as it moves into the 
21st century negotiations with China centre not only on 
force reductions at the conventional level, but also focus 
on the missiles of the IRBM and MRBM range that are 
emplaced in the mountainous caves and valleys of Qinghai 
that border Tibet. So long as China retains these 
missiles, India must match them if only at a later date to 
negotiate them out. 
^ , PAKISTAN 
135. ANEJA (Atul). Early deployment of Prithvi, Agni suggested. 
Hindu. 119,142; 1996, June 14;ll; a-d. 
The determined Pakistani bid to upgrade its atomic 
weapon capability, seen in the reported deployment of M-11 
missiles may leave India with little option but to reject 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and go for an 
early deployment of the Prithvi and Agni missiles. New 
Delhi may also have to accelerate efforts to develop 
advanced means of surveillance and build state-of-the-art 
14B 
anti-missile defences. The around 2000-km range Agni, the 
precursor to an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile 
(IRBM) can introduce an entirely new element to 
deterrence, discouraging use of projectives such as the 
M-11. "The Agni will truly give India an edge over 
Pakistan and could dampen the flourishing Sino-Pak 
collaboration". 
, role of MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR) 
136. DIXIT (Abha). Missiles: India might come under pressure. 
Hindustan Times. 67,198; 1990, July 19;1; b-c. 
The second successful launch of the indigenously 
developed Nag missile by the DRDO recently will once again 
focus international attention on the so-called 
"destabilising trend" of ballistic missile proliferation 
among developing countries and renew the call for 
strengthening the ballistic missile non-proliferation 
regime. In the changed context the options for india are 
extremely limited. Either we acquiesce to the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and work within its 
guidelines or proceed at a faverish pace to achieve 
self-reliance in as many critical sectors as possible to 
make irrelevant the action to be taken under the MTCR. 
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, , USA 
137. AKHTAR MAJEED. Agni from Prithvi to Akash. Strategic 
Studies Journal. 8; 1995; 95-102. 
Whereas it may be possible to develop defences against 
most of the weapon-systems^ an adequate and fool proof 
defence is notpossible against the missile. In the namecf 
the defence, deterrence is the only possible option 
against ballistic missiles, ensuring the certainty of an 
equal or greater damage to be inflicted against the 
adversary. Infact, the US disquit over India's missile 
programme points to US apprehensions, not for Pakistan, 
but the potential Indian capabilities adversely affecting 
the US interests. One requirement that India still needs 
to develop, for effective missile defence system, is the 
strengthening of the reconnaissance capabilities, 
including the satellite-imaging of the enemy territory. 
138. SHARMA (Yudhishtir). Enemy within. Rashtriya Sahara. 2,9; 
1995, Junary; 103. 
Launch technology and satellite technology are 
becomingmoney-spinners and the US insistence that Russia 
renege on its deal for the supply of cryogenic technology 
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to India was prompted largely by the fear of one more 
competitor in the field. But India had already started its 
own indigenous pilot-project in cryogenic technology. 
However, India's insistence that Russia should supply the 
requisite number of engines was to keep the GSLV launches 
on course. It has applied the "mission approach" to 
cryogenic technology just as it did with atomic energy and 
the military missile programme called the Integrated 
Guided Missile Development Programme. 
, , SURFACE TO AIR MISSILE (SAM) 
139. ARUNACHALAM (V S). Significance of Akash. Democratic 
World. 19,42; 1990, October 21;13. 
Akash, the medium range surface to air missile 
flight had its first test from the intermediate test range 
at Chandipore in Orissa. Akash is one of thetnissile 
systems of the Integrated Guided Missiles Programme now 
under-way in the Defence Research and Development 
Organisation. 
, , , TESTING 
140. ANOTHER FEATHER. (Editorial). Times of India. 153,226; 1990, 
August 17;6; a-c. 
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with the successful test-firing of the 'Akash' 
surface to air missile, Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam has added 
another feather to his cap. The headway made by themissile 
programme in the brief period since it was initiated in 
1983 shows that this precondition has been met by according 
to it high enough priority. 
, , TECHNOLOGY, in relation to SOUTH ASIA 
141. MADHOK (V K ) . Towards an open defence policy. Hindustan 
Times. 67,129; 1990, May ll;ll;f. 
Besides Indian aspirations of becoming a regional 
power in South Asia, efforts to balance the super power 
competition for vantage deployment in the Indian ocean, our 
immediate and long-term reaction on Pakistan exploding the 
bomb and utilisation of space systems for military 
purposes are contigencies the nation's defence policy must 
take care of. with the launch of 'Agni' and contemplated 
future missile programmes, India has joined the exclusive 
missile club. 
, NATIONAL SECURITY 
142. NAIR (V K) . Coming decade: India's security environment. 
Link. 34,7; 1991, September 29; 4-7. 
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Any allusion to India's security environment or 
security perspectives tend to focus to mind's attention to 
issues directly related with military activities and those 
too centering automatically on Pakistan. 
143. NARAYANAN (Edatata).For peace and security. Link. 34,7; 
1991, September 29;3. 
India's quest for a place in the current 
phenomenology of unipolarity implies twin objectives of 
individual well-being and security of the state-nation 
entity. 
144. SUBRAMANIAN (K S). National security scenario: Some issues 
and approaches. Indian Defence Review. 11,2;1996, 
April-June; 40-43. 
The national security situation in the country today 
confronts the Government of India with the grimmest crisis 
ever faced since independence. A multiplicity of 
challenges to the administrative, managerial and policy 
capacity of the government has been posed by the emergence 
of terrorism as the most serious threat to the security 
stability and integrity of the nation-state and the 
polity. 
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145. VASUDEVA (P K). Challenges before the new govt, on defence 
and national security. National Herald. 28,87; 1996, June 
5 ; 5; a-c. 
The new government is faced with innumerable 
challenges beside its survival on national security and 
defence matters as it did not receive the required 
attention in he past as far as national security is 
concerned. 
, , ARMS DROP, PURULIA 
146. MEHTA (Ashok K ) . Divide and rule. Sunday. 23,2;1996, 
January 20; 64-5. 
The mysterious and sensational para-drop over 
Purulia of an arms cache consigned by an anonymous donor 
for a faceless benefactor is an appropriate annual summing 
up of India's unguided security scenario. The threats to 
the nation identified so far had been infiltration across 
land and sea frontiers. 
, , compared with CHINA and PAKISTAN 
147. SWARAN SINGH. National security structures: A comparative 
study of India, Pakistan and China. Strategic Analysis. 
16,12; 1994, Marcy; 1535-53. 
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In the post cold war world, where the subject of 
"national security" has become increasingly demanding and 
complex, it is the "Organizational" factor that has come 
to be today of prime importance. Particulary for India, 
which today is not in a position to keep obtaining "state 
of art" technologies or even to compete with its imediate 
neighbours like China and Pakistan in increasing its 
defence spending, the only option is to make maximumuse 
of its available resources; this organizational factor 
seems to be far more reliable as a last resort in seeking 
national security in the face of the immediate threats 
posed by Pakistan and China. 
, , NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 
148. NATIONAL SECURITY. (Editorial). Hindustan Times. 67,58; 
1990,February 28; 11; a-c. 
The National Security Council (NSC) being a part of 
the National Front Government's election manifesto, one 
would expect the Centre to be earnest in implementing the 
idea. The first serious exercise towards this end is 
expected to be the meeting of the Defence Ministry's 
parliamentary consultative committee on March 1 when a 
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draft paper on the subject will be discussed. As Prime 
Minister and Defence Minister, Mr. V.P.Singh will need to 
give the idea of an NSC a concrete shape. The government 
has to be clear in its mind on several points. The draft 
paper apparently suggests that the NSC has been conceived 
as a kind of "think tank" on defence matters without a 
statutory status. 
149. SINHA (S K) . Panel for security: Present system has many 
flaws. Sunday Statesman. 130, 8622; 1991, June 30;6; d-c. 
The growing dimensions of security require that a 
comprehensive view be taken of national security. No doubt 
the military is an important component of national 
security, but there are also other components. 
International relations^ terrorism, insurgency, 
environmental damage across national borders, 
international narcotic traffic, loss of independent 
decision-making as a result of being caught in a debt trap 
and so on have also to be taken into account. In this 
context, a National Security Council becomes an essential 
requirement. 
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150. VOHRA (A M). Defence now needs wider perspective. Time of 
India. 153,64; 1990, March 7;8; f-g. 
In the new organisational set-up, the defence 
ministry would concern itself with important national 
security issues. It would, for instance, provide the 
coordinated views of the chiefs of staffs or the chief of 
defence staff to the NSC. 
151. VOHRA (A M) . Defending the nation. Hindustan Times. 
68,182; 1991, July 2;11; b-d. 
The foremost defence issue that brooks no delay is 
to get a national security structure functional. The most 
important aspect of this structure is a 'think tank' to 
keep global as well as regional developments under review, 
to look into the future and produce inputs for a cabinet 
committee that the National Security Council (NSC) would 
in effect be, to evolve the national security policy. 
, , NEED 
152. SUNDARJI (K). Myopic Strategy. India Today. 15,18; 1990, 
September 30; 147. 
There is a need for a national strategy from which 
national security strategy could flow. National strategy 
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covers the entire gamut of governmental activities. If we 
had already had such structures working/ crises like the 
Gulf one night have been anticipated at least their impact 
on the full spectrum of Indian interests, and possible 
policy options, would have been known for the outset. 
, , DEMOCRACY 
153. JASJIT SINGH. India's strategic and security perspectives. 
Strategic Analysis. 13,5; 1990, August; 475-500. 
The concept of security in India has involved the 
preservation and perpetuation of the core values 
fundamental to the Indian nation state; values revolving 
around democratic norms. In contrast to India's liberal 
democratic system, most of the countries in her 
neighbourhood have chosen the path of authoritarianism of 
different kinds. This generates challenges to India's 
security at the very fundamental level. 
, , ENVIRONMENT, VIEW POINT 
154. KHOSHOO (T N) . Environment; Aspect of Indian security. 
Times of India. 153,24; 1990, January 26;10; g. 
When one talks of national security, one thinks 
usually of the security of geographical borders and of the 
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maintenance of law and order within country. This is based 
on the premise that threats always come from across the 
borders and from anti-national elements within the 
country. But it is also important for a country to defend 
its environmental assets like the people, air space,water 
and land, and all that is on and under land, including 
forests, ecosystems, heritage sites, minerals, underground 
water, etc. 
^ , INDIAN ISLANDS 
155. SATYAVIR SINGH. Indian island territories and national 
security. Indian Defence Review. 10,1;1995, January-March; 
96-7. 
From both the economic and security viewpoint, India 
has to take appropriate measures so that the oceanic 
resources around these island territories are not 
exploited by any foreign power. The major tasks to 
maintain India's security on this strategic front are to 
prevent poaching, smuggling and infiltration; to control 
pollution; and to search and rescue (SAR) of ships or 
boats-in distress. 
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, , INTELLIGENCE 
156. CHAUDHURY (Sreerupa Mitra). Role of intelligence in 
national development and security. Democratic World. 
20,22; 1991, June 2; 6. 
In India danger to security ismore Non-military than 
Military, the compulsion of arms industry over Third World 
countries like India, strategic consideration, 
terrorist movement, external nuclear threat to Indian 
Defence, the foreign relations with Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
Sri Lanka and China, weapon philosophy, intervention of 
the great and small powers in the Indian Ocean have put 
India's external Security on the turbulence. 
, , INTERNAL 
157. BANERJEE (Subrata). Popular consensus for internal 
security. Link. 34,7; 1991, September 29; 7-9. 
The problem of internal security has assumed 
frightening proportions during the last few months. The 
heinous and dastardly assassination of Rajiv Gandhi 
followed by the series of kidnappings and killings of 
innocent people in Kashmir, Punjab and Assam would seem to 
indicate the helplessness of the law and order machinery 
of the state against armed subversion. 
158 
158. NAYAR (V K) . Internal security: Some issues and aspects. 
Indian Defence Review. 1993, January; 25-33. 
The core of handling internal security problem is 
the display of political will to put the house inbrder. 
This can only be projected by a viable policy, a sincere 
and credible approach and dedicated execution entirely 
dictated by national interest. To achieve it, an ethos of 
political expediency and dependence on pressure group must 
be completely eradicated and institutionalised approach to 
problems cultivated. The law and order dimensions of our 
internal security problem have become more complex and 
varied. These require a distinctive assessment of each 
situation to discern the correct methodology of handling it, 
which must always be within the overall policy framework. 
, , , INSURGENCY, NORTH EAST 
159. MEHTA (Ashok K). Theatre of action. Sunday. 22,5; 1995, 
February 4; 84-5. 
The army and the Assam Rifles (left) have suffered 
landmark military disasters in the north-east. The Nagas 
are one of the deadliest jungle insurgent groupsin 
South-East Asia and they have killed more junior army 
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officers than collectively any where else in India. The 
national security approach to the north-east is slipshod. 
An integrated political and military strategy to end 
insurgency is long overdue. The entire region should be 
placed under a reconstituted north-east council for three 
years with an integrated intelligence and internal 
security command under it. 
, , ISSUES 
160. SEN (Avirok ). Battling for attention. India Today. 
21,12; 1996, June 30; 78-9. 
A large and unwidely force that has hardly seen any 
modernisation since 1987, is low on morale and facing 
shortage of equipment. The lack of an expert group to 
guide it on policy matters. An uncertain coalition of 
disparate ideologies in an era of growing concerns over 
national security in the wake of incidents like the 
Purulia arms drop and the unfettered proliferation of 
small arms. 
, , MANAGEMENT 
161. KAMATH (P M). Establish a national security council for 
crises management and security policy making. Daksh. 1,1; 
1996, July; 6-9. 
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Our defence preparedness is compromised by resource 
crunch caused by populist rhetoric and socialistic 
stiffing of individual initiative in the nation's economy. 
There is a lack of political will to acquire defensive 
missilelike Prithvi and Agni, again mainly because of the 
U.S. pressure. 
162. KATHPALIA (P N). National security management. Journal of 
the united Service Institution of India. 120,499; 1990, 
January-March; 147-61. 
A national security act must give statutory 
recognition to a new and broadened concept of National 
Security in close interlocking relationships amongmilitary 
and civilian elements of the Government. Organisationally, 
two agencies need to be created outside the Ministry of 
Defence to effect coordination for National Security-The 
National Security Council, presided over by the Prime 
Minister himself to advise him concerning the integration 
of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the 
national security and the National Intelligence Authority 
under the council's direction, to ensure a sound and 
adequate intelligence base for the formulation and 
execution of national security policies. 
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163. NAYYAR (K K) . Decision-making. Seminar. 383; 1991, July; 
34-8. 
In 1947 the defence services had few Indian officers 
with macro management expertize in defence and above all 
lacked requisite experience and training to fashion or 
design a defence structure for an independent India 
National security issues are incresingly emerging in the 
forefront and the government, with the support of the 
people, will have to evolve policy options to respond to 
them in totality. A national security policy advised by a 
properly staffed institutional framework must, therefore, 
be on top of our new government's agenda. 
164. PANDE (K S). Managing India's security. Daksh. 1,1; 1996, 
July; 10-12. 
India's security is much more than mere defence. It 
covers diverse fields of national endeavour, such as 
political, social, economic, technological, cultural, 
psychological, diplomatic and military, to name some major 
ones. India's national security management has to, first 
of all, stop being psychologically, vulnerable to that 
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'Pain of punishment threatened by foreign diplomats, and 
learn a few lessons from the Chinese about how to deal 
with such pressures with a robust self-confidence. 
165. THAPAN (M L) . Managing defence. Seminar. 383; 1991, July; 
30-33. 
National security is multifaceted and, in its widest 
sense, is concerned with protecting our way of life, our 
social and cultural values, ensuring our economic well 
being, and preserving internal harmony. Simultaneously, it 
involves the maintenance of friendly relations with the 
outside world. We may set out the broad parameters of the 
organization for national security and defence in the 
Indian context in the hope of better days to come. 
166. VOHRA (A M) . Management of defence and national security. 
Journal of the United Service Institution of India. 
120,499,1990, January-March, 142-6. 
It is an admirable development that views on the 
management of defence have been aired in the USI journal 
which has a sizeable readership among the armed forces. It 
is important that the officers of the Services acquire 
familiarity with the shortcomings in the higher control of 
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defence so that they can contribute constructively to its 
improvement when they are in a position to do so. 
, , NATIONAL FRONT 
167. DEVA (Yashwant). Security doctrine for India. Mainstream. 
28,14; 1990, January 27; 55-7. 
In its Election Manifesto, the National Front has 
voiced the need "to evolve an overall security doctrine 
for India, which will be convincii'Cjly peace-oriented. The 
doctrine would take c: total view of defence rather than a 
fractured service-by-service approach which is the case at 
present and would give a central place to self-reliance in 
defence matters". We may now define a security doctrine 
as a formulation of guidelines on which a government 
proposes to ba^ its actions and policies in matters of 
intra-state and intra-state relations and reference. 
^ ^ NUCLEARIZATION 
168. ROY (Sourav A). Weapons of mass destruction and India's 
national security.Strategic Analysis. 15,1; 1992, April; 
45-8. 
National security perceptions, threat concerns as 
well as prestige are the major factors for nuclear 
164 
proliferation and the spread of other kinds of weapons of 
mass-destruction. Another important reason for 
proliferation in the Third World is that the super powers 
fuelled regional conflicts by their aggressive arms 
selling and proxy wars.China has been the major factor for 
proliferation in South Asia and the Indian drive towrds 
nuclear weapon capability was actually led by 
the intimidating nuclear might of China. 
role of USA 
169. MAHAPATRA (Chintamani). U.S. non-proliferation drive and 
India. Current Topics. 18,9; 1992, September; 544, 56. 
India is the only country that had all along 
maintained that it has only a peaceful nuclear programme 
for civilian use.Some scholars in the United States have, 
of come out with a calculation of their own, counting the 
number of nuclear bombs that India can manufacture. But 
« 
they speak merely of India's capability to do so. Far that 
matter, India has never kept secret ofits capability. 
^ ^ DIPLOMACY 
170. NADKARNI (J G). Security needs and integrated response. 
Mainstream. 28,21;1990, March 17; 7-9. 
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We are living in a world where foreign and defence 
policies are becoming increasingly inter-related. This was 
not the case during the early years of our independence. 
In India we still tend to follow a pattern of functioning 
which all modern countries discarded at least by the end 
of the Second World War. Our tendency, even today, is to 
handle most external problems through diplomatic and 
intelligence means in the initial stages, and bring in 
military expertise only when the problem begins to get 
seriously out of control. 
, , RAJIV GANDHI 
171. MATHUR (Girish). Spotlight on India's security concerns. 
Link. 33,30; 1991, March, 3;25. 
Although Rajiv Gandhi's Moscow visit has drawa a 
lot of flak, his initiative in drawing the world's 
attention to India's concern about the post-war security 
arrangements in West Asia is to be commended. Especially 
because the country's security interest had been neglected 
by the governments of V.P. Singh andChandra Shekhar. 
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, , 1990s 
172. AKHTAR MAJEED, Indian security perspectives in the 1990s. 
Asian Survey. 30,11; 1990, November1; 1084-98. 
India's security considerations are not confined to 
its immediate neighbourhood but span a wider area. 
Measures taken by India to cope with these concerns have 
led to anincrease in threat perceptions among its smaller 
neighbours. To counter this perceived threat, the smaller 
nations have developed extraregional links and succumbed 
to arms proliferation. This has led to measures on the 
Indian side for further armed development. 
173. BALARAM {Kj. India in 1990s: Defence compulsions. Indian 
Journal of Political Science. 51,4; 1990, December; 445-68. 
Requirements of national security produce defence 
compulsions. Threats could be from either externa^or 
internal quarters. Threat analyses have been made taking 
into account some major factors. Geo-political 
developments and their effects on national security are 
also taken into account. External threats to India from 
nearby countries and maritime threats are analysed. 
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Internal threats are assessed taking into account the 
prevailing situation. 
174. . SOOD {\j K) . India's international security perspectives 
for the 1990's. Indian Journal of Strategic Studies. 17; 
1992; 1-15. 
Our national security objectives or issues of vital 
security interest for the nation for the 1990's, can be 
summarised as under : (a) Retain our national aspiration 
of remaining a democratic nation with a secular character, 
(b) Ensure creation and existence of suitable strategic 
environment to spur economic and development, growth, (cj 
Be capable of safeguarding our security interests in South 
Asia and the Indian Ocean, (dj Be prepared to assist 
friendly neighbour in maintaining their sovereignty and 
integrity, (ej Ensure self sufficiency and self reliance 
in the field of arms and associated front line 
technologies. 
^ ^ THREAT 
175. JOSHI i^Manoj). Threat perceptions. Seminar. 383; 1991, 
July; 17-25. 
The Indian threat and its threat perceptions are a 
168 
complex affair. Not surprisingly, there is a dialectical 
link between the perception of •the Indian threat created 
by Indian national security policies, by neighbours and 
countries near and far and the threats India itself 
perceives . 
, 1990s 
176. VOHRA (A M). Military policy for the nineties. Journal of 
the United Service Institution of India. 120,499; 1990, 
January-March; 8-20. 
The prevailing global environment of detente and 
conflict resolution by negotiations rules out 
regional hostilities as a spill over of super power 
confrontation. Equally, a look at the regional situation 
from India's point of view, in particular of security 
vis-a-vis China, Pakistan and Nepal, indicates that 
differences are not only manageable diplomatically but 
that india and its neighbours are anxious to solve these 
peacefully; a resort to hostilities is not likely. The low 
key threat to weaken national power by supporting 
insurgencies or sub-ethnic uprisings will continue. 
Internal political solution is the requirement to deal 
with such threats to national security. 
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ZUTSHI i,Amir;. Agenda for defence; Focus on the nineties. 
Statesman. 130, 9383; 1991, July 18;6; c. 
177. If there is any challenge to Indian security during the 
next decade it can only be from the air-land front. From 
Aden to Adelaide, the ocean is dotted with littoral states 
which are too small to pose any threat to India's 
coastline economic zone or shipping interests. 
, NUCLEARIZATION in relation to CHINA-PAKISTAN 
178. SUBRAMANIAN (R R). Nuclearization inevitable. Seminar. 
383; 1991, July; 25-7. 
No issue in this country has been debated as 
extensively as the nuclearization of the Indian armed 
forces without generating any meaningful results. In the 
1960s, it was the Chinese bomb that merited extensive 
attention, but yet no independent nuclear deterrent 
emerged. The nuclearization of Pakistanmakes inevitable 
the nuclearization of the Indian armed forces. However, 
were India to embark on a nuclear weapons and modest 
missile programme based on Agni, it would have 
implications for China as well. 
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179. KAMAL (Nazir). Nuclear and missile proliferation issues: 
Some approaches to stability in South Asia. Contemporary 
Southeast Asia. 13,4; 1992, March; 375-95. 
Ever since the Indian atomic device testin 1974, 
nuclear weapons proliferation in South Asia has been a 
salient regional issue and a cause of increasing 
international concern. Another issue of growing 
significance is the development of ballistic missiles by 
India and Pakistan. Public support in both countries has 
been incresing for exercising the nuclear weapons option 
and accelerating the development of ballistic missiles. 
Alongside these militarization trends, the adversarial 
relationship between India and Pakistan has worsend-
, ORDNANCE, PRODUCTION 
180. PRATAP NARAIN. Defence production needs revamping. Times 
of India. 153, 168; 1990, June 20;6; g. 
In 1945, India was one of the very few third world 
countries with a viable defence production base. Since 
th^ en we have more than doubled the number of our ordnance 
factories. Despite all this, India has the cjubious 
distinction of being the second largest importer of major 
weapons in the third world. 
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, PARA MILIATRY, BORDER SECURITY FORCE, APPRAISAL 
181. SHYAM SINGH. Border Security force: An appraisal. Defence 
Today. 4,1; 1996, January-March; 40-47. 
The BSF's primary role is to provide and ensure 
the security of the bordersof India. It guards the land 
frontiers of the nation against foreign intrusion, it 
prevents illegal transborder traffic inmen and material. 
It checks and stops in filtration, incursion, penetration, 
smuggling of arms, ammunition and explosives, narcotics 
and bullion. 
, PLANNING 
182. CHAUDHURY (Rahul Roy). Higher defence planning in India: 
Critical need for reassessment. Strategic Analysis. 16,7; 
1993, October; 823-36. 
It is indeed frustrating that a satisfactory 
mechanism for higher defence planning does not exist in 
the country. This is clearly not due to the absence of 
formal structures to this effect, nor its lack of 
importance in affairs of state. Various committees and 
organisations are present to provide a national security 
17 > 
doctrine, but they have simply not been able to do so in 
any coherent or meaningful manner. 
183. HAZARI (K K). and NAIR (Vijay K). Higher defence planning: 
The need for debate and reform. Indian Defence Review. 
8,2; 1993, April; 33-40. 
National security is the core of national plicy. It 
is not the prerogative of the military. Its includes 
allelements of power making. The time has come when india 
must clearly define its vital interest, identity national 
objectives and formulate holistic policies to meet them. 
184. JASJIT SINGH. Defence doctrine and policy planning in 
India. Strategic Analysis. 16,6*, 1993, September; 64 3-5 5. 
After a resounding military victory followed by 21 
years of peace, it would be natural and easy to adopt a 
stance that our system of higher direction and management 
of defence policy has not only stood the test of time, 
but, in fact, is also capable of meeting future needs. 
185. MALIK (V P}. Defence planning system in India. Strategic 
Analysis. 13,1; 1990, April; 29-44. 
There is an intimate connection between defence and 
development, between prosperity and security. Defence 
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planning is an important as the development for the 
prosperity of the country. 
^ ^ effect of GULF WAR 
186. MUKERJEE (Dilip). India's defence needs: Some pointers 
from Gulf war. Times of India. 154, 57; 1991, March 8; 8 ; 
b-d-. 
Indian analysts have beenpressing since the 
mid-1980s for adopting military doctrines and capabilities 
to the rapid changes in the technological environment 
stanning from the introduction of sophisticated new 
weapons. The military disaster that Iraq has suffered as a 
result of the US-led coalition's success in neutralising 
within hours Iraq's substantial air force-nearly the same 
size as India's- underlines the complelling need for a 
searching reappraisal of our military planning. 
,---, 1990s 
187. PENDSE (K S). India's defence planning in the nineties. 
Trishul. 4,1; 1991, July; 15-21. 
No nation can arm itself to the teeth, as such an 
option is an unaffordable one. Calculated risks are the 
very substance of defence planning. 
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, ,PLANNING role of PLANNING COMMISSION 
188. VIR NARAIN. Security council: Need for caution. Times of 
India. 153,44; 1990, February 15;8; g. 
Modern defence establishments are large consumers 
of technical and managerialmanpower as well as foreign 
exchange-all scarce resources critically required in a 
developing economy. The Planning Commission, charged with 
the task of planned overall economic growth, could help a 
great dealin optimising the interaction between military 
expenditure and economic growth. The idea needs to be 
developed further but two steps in this direction could be 
the inclusion of the Deputy Chairman of the Planning 
Commission in the National Security Committee of the 
cabinet (NSCC) and the creation of a suitable division or 
cell within the Planning Commission. 
, PREPAREDNESS 
189. REDDI (G B). Defence preparedness-issues and choices: An 
agenda for the twenty-first century. Indian Defence 
Review. 11,2; 1996, April- June; 32-9. 
Our defence preparedness issues and choices at the 
macro level are easy to identify. First our approach needs 
17b 
major refinement. With the availability of weapons of mass 
destruction, we cannot continue with defensive strategic. 
An offensive strategic orientation is a vital imperative 
for which a variety of changes are inevitable, in 
particular, to wage low-intensity conflicts and nuclear 
warefare. 
, REGIONAL SECURITY role of PAKISTAN 
190. PAK's ABETMENT of terrorism jeopardises regional security. 
Democratic World. 22,8; 1993, April 30; 7-8. 
The assessmentof the security situation in the 
sub-continent is more ominous in the latest annual reports 
of the defence ministry and the ministry of external 
affairs, the latter cautioning that unless the "distant 
negative trend in Pakistan's attitude towards improving 
relations with India is reversed, adversarial and tense 
interaction could be the prospects in the foreseable 
future." 
, REVIEW 
191. MAROOF RAZA. Policy imperatives for an India at war with 
itself. Combat Journal. 20,1; 1993, April; 15-22. 
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Although there has been an attempted shift towrds 
formulating new policy imperatives that focus towards 
national security concerns emerging from an India at war 
with itself, there appears to be a lack of cohesion in 
facing the demands that low intensity conflicts are 
placing on the India political framework. If India is 
desirous of retaining its axiomatic status in South Asia 
(and there is every indication, that it is desirous of 
doing so), then there is obviously a need for India to go 
beyond the policy limitations which have been evolved to 
suit the politico-bureaucratic interests of India's 
national elite. 
' role of BUREAUCRACY 
192. MEHTA (Ashok K). Operating in isolation. Sunday. 22,14; 
1995, April 8; 64-5. 
It is the defence secretary, believe it or not, who 
holds the nation's military compass despite being the only 
secretary in the government who has three service chiefs 
senior to him. These days, the Prime Minister, whois also 
the defence ministr, has little time for defence. For 
example, ever since the last army Chief died in November 
177 
last year, his replacement's successor to the army's 
training command has yet to be appointed. Who has the time 
to look at ministry of defence files? And army chiefs are 
not accustomed to making a fax call tothe PM. Operation 
Bluestar, Hazratbal and Chrar-e- Sharif are a fall-out of 
this lack of interaction. 
^ ^ POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 
193. MUKERJEE iDilip). Problem. Seminar. 383; 1991, July; 12-4. 
Our Chief problem is that India's armed forces 
operate without a formal brief from thepolitical leadership 
assessing security threats and setting priorities which 
the service headquarters are to keep in mind in making 
their forward plans. In the absence of this, each of the 
three services wants to cover itself against all probable 
risks, making judgements on that basis regarding 
equipment, manpower and deployment. 
, TECHNOLOGY, CONTROVERSIES 
194. KARNAD (Bharat). Is high-tech the answer? Seminar. 383; 
1991, July,- 28-30. 
The thinking of the Indian military has reached 
that elevated plan where technology is entirely divorced 
178 
from its utility. A higher technology weapon is not 
necessarily better or more effective. Indeed, it is likely 
to prove more of a liability. 'Appropriate technology' 
which is the operative mantra in the development sphere 
needs to be the touchstone of the Indian military's plans 
and piolicies too. 
,--, 1990s 
195. MADHOK (V K). Conventional defence initiatives in the 
1990s. Journal of the United Service Institution of India. 
120, 499; 1990, January-March; 93-6. 
During the next 10-20 years, besides the race for 
space and keeping an open mind on ' Nuclearology' the 
defence forces as well as the country need to focus 
their attention on: application of technology, 
indigenisation and self sufficiency; towards evolving a 
'Total Force Concept', use of space systems to support 
various functions on ground and for improving mobility and 
logistics. 
, WEAPONS, DRDO -•- ' '^ 
196. ARUNACHALAM (V S). Providing the winning edge. Democratic 
World. 20,4; 1991, January 27; 13-4. 
Highly accurate and lethal weapon systems give any 
defence force the necessary competitive and decisive edge. 
And providing this winning edge to our Armed Force is the 
Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). The 
need for self-reliance in defenc requirements assumes 
urgency in view of the incresingly high cost of modern 
warfare equipment and also to ensure a continuous and 
uninterrupted supply. 
, , GUNS, 155 mm 
197. NO MORE purchase of 15-MM guns from abroad. Democratic 
World. 19,9; 1990, March 4;7. 
India will not buy any more 155 MM Howitzers from 
foreign sources, including Austria and France. Although a 
lot of controversy was generated on the purchase of 
Swedish guns, artillery experts feel that the consignment 
of 410 guns from the Bofors was sufficient enough for the 
forces at present. 
180 
198. 155 MM GUN acquisition. Indian Defence Review Digest. 3 ; 
1992, March; 47-57. 
The 155 mm gun must now form our med backbone 
against well fortified defences, or against mechanised 
forces. Willy nilly our tectical appliction of fire on 
area of neutralisation basis must change to neutralisation 
of specifics given the kind of inputs available with the 
155 mm. 
, , PROCUREMENT compared with INDIGENISATION 
199. LUTHRA (G). Defence procurement policy of India: Approach 
for the future. Trishul. 8,1; 1995, Autumn; 38-48. 
Although indigenisation has been reasonably 
successful in India, budgetory constraints and spiraling 
costs have called into question the management of 
indigenisation. The concept of Value for Money does not 
reinforce the relentless drive for indigenisation 
although it recognises the need for self-reliance. 
^ ^ SELF RELIANCE 
200. MUKHERJEE (Dilip). Self-reliance in weapons: Need to set 
realistic goals. Times of India. 154,276; 1991, November 
19;6; b-d. 
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It is appropriate for India to have sizable 
industrial sector geared to meet the needs of its large 
military establishment. 
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